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 This thesis follows the development of Howard Charles Green’s (1895-1989) views on 
war and disarmament as both a private citizen and as a Member of Parliament.  It draws its 
conclusions from a large archival base.  Beginning with Green’s experiences in the First World 
War, this thesis charts Green’s views on war through to the United Nations Irish Resolution on 
disarmament of December 20, 1960.  Contrary to current historiography examining the 
Diefenbaker period, it proves that Green’s beliefs about war only changed after his appointment 
as Secretary of State for External Affairs in June 1959, and even then it took time for his new 
ideals to “harden.”  Prior to his “conversion” he believed that war remained a viable aspect of 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
 
 
CEF Canadian Expeditionary Force 
COTC Canadian Officer’s Training Corps 
DEA Department of External Affairs 
DND Department of National Defence 
GHQ General Headquarters 
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 
OP Observation Post 
OR Other Ranks 
SSEA Secretary of State for External Affairs 
TNDC Ten Nation Disarmament Committee 
UNAEC United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 
UNDC United Nations Disarmament Council 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 





 “Yeah but he was nuts!”  In casual conversation with peers and professors, this is often 
the sort of attitude (and sometimes the comment) I first encounter when discussing the subject of 
this thesis.  Howard Charles Green (1895-1989) served as an Opposition Member of Parliament 
for twenty-one-and-a-half years, exerting considerable influence and fame as a prominent Tory 
and British Columbian politician.  When the Progressive Conservatives under the leadership of 
John G. Diefenbaker won a minority government in 1957, Green was appointed Minister of 
Public Works and Acting Minister of Defence Production.  After the death of Sidney Smith, 
Green was appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) on June 4, 1959.  Within 
months of assuming his new position, Green began a crusade for disarmament that lasted until 
his defeat in the 1963 federal election.  However, the Diefenbaker government had also 
committed itself to several roles and weapons systems that required nuclear warheads.  By 
holding steadfastly to his disarmament convictions, Green contributed to the cabinet deadlock 
that eventually toppled the Diefenbaker government in early 1963. 
Both the Department of National Defence (DND) and the American government desired 
an array of nuclear weapons for Canada.  Erica Simpson has dubbed this group of organizations 
“Defenders,”(of Canada’s nuclear option) and their viewpoint has generally dominated the 
historiography to date given that their beliefs ultimately prevailed with the election of the 




                                                
1
 Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics, (London, McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2001), 5. 
2 
 Few authors have devoted significant portions of their studies to the Department of 
External Affairs’ (DEA) position and perspective.  Studies by Knowlton Nash, Peter Newman, 
Patrick Nicholson, and Denis Smith all focus on the acquisition perspective at the expense of the 
contrary goal of disarmament.
2
  In short, they examine the question through a Defender rather 
than Critic lens.  Initially, under the supervision of Diefenbaker, and subsequently Sidney Smith, 
the Department of External Affairs (DEA) exhibited the traits of a Defender rather than a Critic.  
However, Sidney Smith’s death on 13 March 1959 allowed Diefenbaker to choose a new SSEA.  
The appointment of Howard Green soon reversed DEA’s position to a Critic perspective, and 
competition ensued to control both Canada’s role at international disarmament negotiations and 
its pending acquisition of nuclear weapons.  Again, this conflict continued with increasing 
fervour until the fall of the Diefenbaker government in 1963. 
When Green’s motives and actions are discussed, the discussion is usually uneven and 
lacks sympathy.  Diefenbaker’s memoirs are self-serving and unreliable.
3
  Peyton Lyon narrates 
and analyzes Green’s efforts from 1961-1963 and disparages Green’s choices.
4
  Richard 
Preston’s interpretation of Green’s disarmament efforts from 1959-1961 is more sympathetic, but 
his study could not draw upon the archival materials now available.
5
  Albert Legault and Michel 
Fortmann provide readers with a detailed narrative of Canada’s conduct at the various 
disarmament negotiations, but their brief descriptions of Green’s motives are usually 
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  By contrast, Michael Tucker’s study of Canada’s disarmament policy 
from 1957-1971 recognized Green’s contradictory distastes of communism and nuclear weapons, 
providing a more complex and nuanced individual than other authors.  Tucker’s argument that 
Green used disarmament as a vehicle to assert Canadian sovereignty, while valid, is overstated, 
and he erroneously describes Green as harbouring an “aversion” to NATO.
7
  Like Preston, the 
chief limitation of Tucker’s work was his lack of access to the vast archival resources now 
available.    Patricia McMahon drew upon some of this material, and her thesis provides fresh 
interpretations about Green’s development, but her focus on Diefenbaker precluded rigorous 
assessment of Green’s views.
8
  A focused study on Howard Green is needed to better understand 
Canadian decision-making during the nuclear crisis of the early 1960s. 
How Howard Green acquired his strong disarmament convictions remains a key 
unanswered question.  Chapter 1 begins to analyze this question by examining Green’s 
experiences in the First World War.  Several authors claim that Green’s later aversion to war was 
“Above all… stirred by memories of the horrors of World War I.”
9
  Foremost among these 
horrors is the myth that Green was wounded.  An examination of Green’s letters and war record 
challenge these conclusions.  During this early period Green was stirred by ideals of manhood 
and the righteousness of the British war effort, and although he participated in remarkably little 
combat, was never wounded and never fully lived out his bloodthirsty rhetoric in combat, he did 
witness the horror of war.  While his views on war matured because of these experiences, he re-
entered “civvy” with many of his ideas about war intact. 
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Chapter 2 narrates the development of Green’s views on war from the inter-war period 
until the 1957 election.  Contrary to current Diefenbaker historiography that portrays him as a 
peacemonger following the Great War, Green continued to believe that war was a necessary 
component of foreign policy.  During the Second World War, Green repeatedly called for a more 
total war effort, including full conscription. Throughout this period he was also a constant 
advocate for Canadian veterans, as he was both proud of their efforts and empathized with their 
suffering. 
V-J Day did not end Green’s interest in conflict.  The detonation of the atomic bombs 
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki revealed the destructive power of atomic energy to the world, and 
Green quickly realized its potential.  His primary interest was the technology’s civil application 
but he obtained an education in its war potential as well.  In spite of the knowledge he gained in 
House of Commons committees, he did not fear atomic warfare and continued to believe that it 
was survivable.  During the Korean conflict, Green again pushed for a heightened war effort and 
even advocated policies that could have expanded the war beyond the Korean peninsula.  More 
generally, Green’s continued interest in external affairs throughout this period informed him 
about possible international roles for Canada.  Intellectually he agreed with Canada’s multilateral 
post-war role, however emotionally he continued to cling to the Commonwealth.  Thus, during 
the Suez Crisis of 1956, Green was torn between these two ideologies. Nevertheless, and 
significantly, Green failed to profess opposition to war from the 1920s to the late 1950s.  Little in 
the preceding chapters will surprise those who have studied this period in depth, but this 
narrative does not align with Diefenbaker historiography. 
The last chapter of this thesis examines the development of Green’s views on war from 
1957 to the adoption of an Irish Resolution on nuclear proliferation at the United Nations 
5 
General Assembly (UNGA) in 1960.  The chapter explains why Green only developed his 
aversion to war after June 1959.  Using material declassified material, the thesis also describes 
the events by which Green’s courage and conviction gradually hardened.  This study ends in 
December 1960 with Canada’s participation in the 15
th
 Session of the UNGA, where Green’s 
conduct correctly led to his designation as a crusader for disarmament.  Green continued as 
SSEA for another two-and-a-quarter years, but these events would, and indeed have, required 
entire theses to evaluate adequately.  Moreover, at this stage Green’s conversion was complete, 
and these later years allowed Green’s convictions to play out rather than to substantively develop 
further.
10
  In order to understand Green’s actions, we must begin at the eve of what became 
known as the Great War. 
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 This thesis is not intended as a biography.  Themes such as Howard Green’s family life, activities in British 
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Chapter 1: Bayonets 
 
 Howard Charles Green was born on November 5, 1895.  His father Samuel owned part of 
a general store in the mining town of Kaslo, British Columbia.  His mother Flora, was a devout 
Baptist but, because the town lacked a Baptist church, the family followed his father’s side and 
joined the Methodist church.
1
  Flora’s family traced their roots to Nova Scotia where some had 
arrived as Empire Loyalists and others pre-dated the American Revolution.
2
  As such, Howard, 
like a great many of his peers, developed a strong affinity for the British Empire. 
His initial schooling was in a three-room schoolhouse.  His elementary schooling took 
place in a single room.  High school was in the next room where one teacher taught all subjects.
3
  
The curriculum further indoctrinated him in the ideals of Empire and manliness.  He was a strong 
student and his family “scraped” together the money to send him to university.
4
  Howard was the 
first of his family to do so.  Arriving at the University of Toronto (U of T), Green began second 
year courses towards a Bachelor of Arts degree.
5
   
Green was eighteen when Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914.  Many of 
his peers left university to enlist.  Instead of following, Green joined the Canadian Officer’s 
Training Corps (COTC) (even though it was not formally established at U of T until mid-
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October of that year).
6
   Created in 1912, the program was designed to allow male university 
students to develop junior officer skills while continuing their academic studies.
7
 Upon 
completion of COTC curriculum, students wrote a “series of standardized written and practical 
examinations produced by the war office.”
8
  If students passed, they were qualified for a 
commission as a lieutenant or captain. 
 Unsurprisingly, given his context, Green had no qualms about war.  First, he believed that 
Britain and its allies fought with just cause.  He explained to his father in January 1915 that those 
who demeed the war unnecessary “don’t see the whole justice of our cause, the danger in the 
german [sic] system, and the self-sacrificing way in which the British have entered it.”
9
  Second, 
as a citizen of the British Empire, he believed he had an obligation to serve.  In letters to his 
parents, he frequently explained how his “conscience” would not allow him to remain safe while 
others died in Europe: “You know yourself dad how a man will feel in future years who had 
done nothing in this crisis.”
10
  Green even tied obligation to benefit. “This war is going to do one 
thing for us it will make us strong and the Empire strong even if it does take many valuable lives 
for the making.”
11
  War for Green was a positive, rather than negative, phenomenon.  Gender 
roles also provided motivation.  When German U-boats sank the Lusitania in May 1915, Green 
wrote: 
                                                
6
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Those dirty sneaky [illegible]… of germans [sic] can’t be content with fighting 
men but must fight women.  If I could just feel myself putting a big bayonet right 
through one of the skunk’s stomachs and rip him from toes to head. I’d be content 
to get one myself.
12
 




Like many of his COTC peers, Green wanted to join the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
(CEF) as an officer.  For those who lacked any militia training, the COTC was a means to qualify 
for officer status;
 
continuing his education was therefore both practical and self-serving.  
Moreover, as a prideful Westerner, Green wanted a commission in a British Columbia battalion, 
preferably raised in the Kootenays that he still considered home.
14
  Having been in Ontario 
during the initial recruitment rush, he missed the raising of BC’s two initial battalions.  Luckily 
for Green, recruitment exploded in 1915.
 15
  When he received word that the federal government 
had authorized the raising of the 54
th
 Kootenay battalion, he immediately sent a letter to the 
intended Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mahlon Davis, asking for a commission.  It 
was months before he received a reply. 
In the meantime Green continued with his COTC training.  Students received instruction 
in “drill, elementary battle tactics for small units, military law, administrative procedures, 
shooting and army organization.”
16
  One of this highlights of training occurred after his exams in 
May 1915, when the COTC held a two-week training camp at Niagara-on-the-Lake.  Activities 
included parades with an Inspection by the Minister of Militia Sam Hughes, tactical exercises, 
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  Green particularly enjoyed taking a turn at drilling some of his peers and firing 
fifty rounds with the new Mk III Ross Rifle that he described as a “beaut.”
18
  His conceptions of 
war were likely normal: idealized and even naive.  After months of anxious waiting he finally 
received notice in early May that he could serve as a Lieutenant in the 54
th
 battalion, and by the 
20
th




* * * 
 
So began six months of basic training.  The program was typical.  Green rose at 0530 for 
“physical jerks” (physical training) at 0545.  After the physical training came a cold shower 
followed by breakfast at 0700.  Drill and marches dominated the remainder of the day, with 
breaks for lunch and meetings with the colonel.  Drill ended at 1630 with dinner at 1900 and 
lights-out by 2200.  Though Green seems to have adapted fairly quickly, he confessed to 
sometimes feeling like a “round peg in a square hole.”  Never an early riser, he found the early 
mornings particularly trying.
 20
   On occasion he also found it difficult to suppress his opinions 
and quickly recognized that “it will pay to keep my mouth shut.”
21
  However, like those around 
him, he quickly learned from his mistakes and developed confidence in his unit and himself. 
Green’s training was highly gendered.  Popular belief held that masculine attitudes would 
help achieve national ends on the battlefield.
22
  Robert Dean has explained that: “To be 
                                                
17
 Ibid, 105-106. 
18
 Howard to Mother, 6 May 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 7, Howard to Folks, 9 May 1915, CVA Add. 
MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 4, 2-3. 
19
 Howard to Dad, 25 April 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 1; LAC RG150 Acc 1992-93 166 Box 
3777-48, Green, Howard, Charles. 
20
 Howard to Mother, 16 June 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-C-6 File 12, 1-2; Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 
80-81. 
21
 Howard to Mother, 4 July 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-C-6 File 12, 2. 
22
 Mosse, The Image of Man, 109-110. 
10 
recognized socially (as an affirmation of ‘masculinity’ or ‘femininity’), the individual must 
deploy a narrative (or narratives) that fall within a range of culturally accepted types.”
23
 Green 
was no exception and exhibited a variety of accepted traits.  For instance, though Green was no 
scrapper, frustration caused him to engage in: 
a strenuous fight [with his tent mate Lieutenant Frank Davidson Smith] … He 
[Smith] got what they call a double nelson on me I had to give in.  Have a good 
stiff neck as a result.  No wiser I licked him on Wednesday incidentally making 
his nose bleed so there are no hard feelings.
24
 
As both men inflicted bodily harm to the other, their self-respect remained intact and they 
continued as tent mates until shortly after their arrival in Britain.  Similarly, the battalion’s four-
month-old black bear cub mascot named “Jerry Koots” also facilitated displays of manly 
prowess.
25
  At first Green described the bear as “cute” and commented that “sometimes the bear 
will play like a dog but at other times he snaps at you.”
26
  Over time the bear became much less 
amicable.  On one occasion Koots “swiped” Green’s hand when offered a cherry and at two 
other times he either escaped or, as Green suspected, was let loose.  In the later case, the bear ran 
from tent to tent for half an hour before someone “lassoed his hind leg” and even then the bear 
scratched several of its captors before it was subdued.
27
 The soldiers of the 54
th
 expected to tame 
both man and beast. 
Green’s beliefs about war remained unchanged during his initial training.  On the one 
hand, he had enlisted after the battle of 2
nd
 Ypres and was well aware of the abhorrent casualties 
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  However the training seems to have lacked realism in both practice and 
conception.  In October, Green wrote: 
This morning the Colonel intended to have the battalion practise attacking and let 
certain men and officers drop out as casualties so that it would be more real.  
However the rain sort of put a stop to the scheme.  When it does come off I am 




In hindsight it is perverse that units bound for the Western Front cancelled training exercises 
because of the weather.  Moreover, Green’s attitude remained strikingly positive.  Though he 
was aware of the trials that awaited his unit in Europe, he failed to fathom war’s true horror.  In 
another case, a course was held on “bombing” in which the class was shown how to both build 
and throw live bombs.
30
  Green devoted a series of enthusiastic letters to the topic that in one 
case included small hand-drawn pictures of each type of bomb constructed and did not envisage 
their terrible effects.
31
  Green recognized but did not yet empathise with war’s destructive 
potential.  Surely this was common at the time, but it is important to note that Green was no 
peacemonger. 
  
* * * 
 
 Upon arrival in England, the Kootenay battalion was moved to Bramshott Camp where it 
was more adequately prepared for war. With the exception of their Ross rifles, deficient 
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12 
Canadian equipment was replaced with British kit.
32
  The training took the usual forms of drill, 
marches, musketry, and bombing.  Green continued to enjoy bayonet training and stabbed the 
sacks of straw “just as if I had a big fat german [sic] on the point.”
33
  Some became specialists.  
Smith became the battalion’s bombing officer and he and Green saw less and less of each other.  
Eventually the two found new tent mates.
34
 
 Breaks from the training allowed Green to visit many of the sites about which he had so 
often read and idolized.  He was granted leave to London close to New Year’s, and like others, 
enjoyed visiting many of the sites he had long read about.  He saw the Prime Minister’s house, 
museums, and the crown jewels.  He allowed himself to be thoroughly engrossed while listening 
to a debate in Parliament on conscription and devoted several pages of a letter to detailing some 
of the speeches he overheard.
35
  These happy occasions further endeared him to the empire and 
likely influenced his foreign poålicy statements for the next half century.  Other disruptions were 
less enjoyable.  Measles reached near epidemic proportions in March 1916 at Bramshott.  Green 
was hospitalized for a few weeks under quarantine.
36
  This episode marked the only occasion 
during the war when Green was hospitalized.
37
 Howard Green carried no wounds when arguing 
for disarmament decades later. 
 Gendered ideals continued at Bramshott.  Sports were integral to maintaining physical 
fitness and boasting.  Platoons played against each other and instilled abundant unit pride; Green 
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personally believed that his platoon “should have no trouble cleaning up the [soccer] league.”
38
  
As it turned out his confidence was justified and his platoon finished on top.
39
  Green particularly 
enjoyed observing his mens’ physical development and watching it translate into increased 
competitive edge.  He and his men felt fit and ready for war.
40
 
 Green did not accept all manhood ideals.  As Robert Dean points out: “There is always a 
tension between the lived experience of individual masculinities and cultural ideals of manhood” 
because “the demands of social life are not uniform but multifaceted and contradictory.”
41
  For 
instance, when Sam Hughes reviewed the Kootenay battalion, Green had difficulty taking the 
Minister of Militia and Defence seriously.  At one point his “Ministerial Majesty,” aware of 
Green’s connection to Robert Green (MP for Kootenay, later Kootenay West), approached the 
young Lieutenant and asked whether Green was going to discard his glasses.  To please Hughes, 
Green lied and replied in the affirmative, and Hughes replied: “That’s good.”
42
  Though Green 
shared many of the gendered ideals of his time, he had his limits. 
The conflict between ideals and reality, combined with the monotony of training, 
facilitated self-reflection.  Green often wondered about how he would react when under fire for 
the first time.  On each occasion he concluded that he would fulfil his obligations.  One such 
reflection is worth quoting at length: 
I think I am as ready to go over as I ever shall be for I shan’t learn much more of 
the work here [Bramshott] and I think I am now at the stage where I don’t care 
whether a bullet gets me or not.  I hope so anyway for if one spends much time 
worrying about them he can’t fight.  It is amusing sometimes to think that I’m 
really ready to go over.  Was always supposed to be such a studious, peaceful 
brute[.]  You can hardly understand how it worried me, not being good at athletics 
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and sort of looked down on in some circles on that account.  The war has given 
me a chance and I wouldn’t have missed it for anything.  If I do get back I can 
know that I’m not a coward and that I’ve done my duty.
43
 
Confidence in his training, his own abilities, his men, and his battalion further reinforced this 
conviction. 
 




 crossed the English Channel as part of the 11
th
 Brigade in Canada’s 4
th
 Division, 
landing in Le Havre on 14 August 1916.
44
  Green’s experiences during the next year were typical 
for an infantryman.  He received considerable gas training, including exposure to real gas.   
Some passed-out from fright, but despite Green’s subsequent propensity for fainting he did not 
falter.
45
  Within the first day of his company entering the trenches, Green lost Lance Corporal 
Jack Hannah whose jugular was cut by a shell fragment.  According to Green, his men handled 
the loss – the first in the battalion - “like veterans” and were solaced by their own artillery’s 
reprisals.
46
  He saw rats, ran from the path of incoming shells, and even heard a mistaken gas 
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  Conditions were actually better than he had expected and he confided to his diary that: 
“Life in the front line [was] not so bad after all.”
48
  Over time, Green settled into the routine and 
rotation of trench warfare.  He covered his helmet with a sandbag to prevent the shiny metal 
from drawing the attention of the enemy.  Bathing became less regular.
49
  He saw and understood 
trench warfare, and his confidence grew.  By mid-September he believed he could “stand 
ordinary trench warfare and hope to be able to test myself in the more active kind of war… such 
as raiding.”  He admired “fatalists” who “work at night quite in the open, standing still when a 
flare goes up and dropping when the machine guns strafe.”  Before joining their ranks, however, 
he hoped to further develop his nerve.
50
  
An opportunity arose at the bloody Somme battles.  Canada’s other three divisions had 
tried and failed to capture Regina Trench.
51
  The 54
th
 battalion entered the theatre near Albert on 
11 October.  On 21 October, Green joined one of three carrying parties of twenty men into no-




 battalion staged their own attack on a 600-yard section of 
Regina Trench.  Likely carrying ammunition or bringing the wounded back to the Canadian 
lines, Green remained “right up around” the attack.  The operation achieved its objectives and 
Green was enthused.
52
  Though he had not served in a combat role, he had ventured over-the-top.  
To his frustration, this was the extent of his involvement in attacks on the Somme.  The 54
th
 was 
subsequently involved in capturing Desire Trench, but Green did not participate.  Due to high 
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 only half of the battalion’s officers went forward with each attack.  
Green joined his men when preparing for the attack but after the operation was twice postponed a 
waiting officer took his place.  When the attack finally commenced on November 18, Green 




Green was saddened by the experience.  On the one hand the casualties from the battle 
were appalling.  A long list of his friends, including Smith, were wounded; others were dead.  
Despite these facts, Green described himself as having been “unfortunate enough to be left right 
out of the whole show and on the Home guard so to speak.  It is a poor feeling one gets when one 
is left back like that.”
55
  G.W.L. Nicholson wrote that, in seven weeks of continuous fighting on 
the Somme, the 4
th




 After spending a few weeks rest in Ourton, the 54
th
 marched to Vimy Ridge where 
Green’s hatred for the enemy remained strong.  On Christmas Day 1916, Green was in the front 
line and the battalion to the right of the 54
th
 right mingled with their German opposition in no-
man’s-land.  When six German soldiers opposite the 54
th
’s lines arose from their lines hoping to 
share in similar festivities they were forced to flee under Canadian fire.  The Germans 
reciprocated by heavily strafing the Canadian lines.  54
th
ers shared the common belief that 
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“We’re here to kill huns and the more we kill the sooner we get home.”
57
  Even on Christmas, 
Green maintained a combatant spirit and looked forward to being able to say that he had spent a 
Christmas in the front lines.
58
 
The Canadian front remained relatively quiet in January and February 1917.  The 
battalion war diarist had little to record other than that the weather was “cold and clear” and 
occasionally “clear and cold.”
59
  Several other Canadian battalions began a raiding campaign and 
competition soon ensued to capture most prisoners or wreak the most destruction.
60
  On 17 
February the 54
th
 began preparing for the largest raid of the war, employing 1,700 men from all 
battalions of the 4
th
 Division. The plan was to use gas to overcome the enemy’s particularly 
strong defences on Hill 145.  Unfortunately the plan misjudged the effects of gas warfare.
61
 The 
battalion CO, Lieut.-Colonel Kemball, objected to the raid because of the unpredictable winds.  
The commander of the 75
th
 battalion also objected, and even General Odlum subsequently 
questioned how the men would cross no-man’s-land if the gas failed to perform as expected.  
Postponements of the attack resulted in a few of the gas canisters being punctured by German 
artillery and alerted them of the upcoming attack.  However Lieut.-Colonel Ironside (GSO 1, 4
th
 
Canadian Division) overruled any objections and insisted that the raid go ahead as planned.  
Kemball, believing the raid ill advised, planned to personally head his battalion’s assault.
62
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Green was again spared the risks of combat.  Just prior to the attack on the night of 27 
February, Kemball ordered Green to go on a five-week course at 1
st
 Army School near 
Boulogne.  Green asked the colonel to reconsider: claiming that he was serving as second in 
command of his company because its captain was drunk.
63
  Kemball insisted that the company 
captain would lead the attack and that Green would leave for the course.  Green departed the 
following morning.  In later years he reflected that Kemball was a friend of Green’s father and 
this may have led to Green’s timely absence.
64
   
News of the attack’s utter failure reached him a week later.  The Canadian artillery had 
failed to cut the barbed wire defences, and because the Germans were prepared for the gas they 
cut down the incoming Canadians.  The 54
th
 battalion suffered the heaviest losses with 226 
casualties.  On 3 March the Germans offered a ceasefire, removed Kemball’s body from the 
barbed wire, and placed it in front of the Canadian lines.
65
 Green was devastated by the news.  
He particularly mourned the loss of Kemball and thought of revenge: “The loss of the Colonel 
has changed my views of the war a good deal and I hope it will not be over until I can bayonet 5 
Bavarians for myself and 4 for the OC.”
66
  The tragedy of war did not compromise Green’s 
rhetoric, it strengthened it. 
Green moved on.  The five-week course included training in the usual infantry skills.  
Once again Green focused on bayonet training in his letters, remarking that “whenever they 
teach bayonet work they make you see red [Green’s emphasis].”  Like many generals, Green 
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continued to believe that “the side that is best at close range is bound to win in the end and now 
that we have artillery to back us it looks like a sorry day for the Huns” and still hoped to put his 
developed skills to use.
67
 Again, the war was not making him a peacemonger; at times it had the 
opposite effect. 
 The course ended in time for Green to witness the Canadian Corps’ attack on Vimy 
Ridge.  Like all units, the 54
th
 had been practicing for weeks and Green’s long absence 
disqualified him from participating except as a reserve.  He desperately wanted to be in the 
attack but, to his chagrin, he was never ordered forward.  For the first few days of the operation 
he remained well behind the lines and did not see the battlefield until the 13
tt
; describing it as a 
“rather awful sight.”
68
  After the battle Green walked through the field, picking up a variety of 
items including a German helmet and “ridge mud” to send home to his family.
69
  Like others, he 
considered the attack a great victory.  Furthermore, he believed Germany had to be soundly 
beaten with more attacks. “Everything is going our way” Green boasted, “there will be plenty of 
casualties yet but the end is possible now.”
70
 
 Things were also going Green’s way.  Shortly after Vimy he was recommended for 
acting captaincy of C company.  Though he was saddened to leave his comrades in A company, 
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he had long desired a promotion.
71
  The move was likely eased by the fact that he barely 
recognized his battalion after the arrival of so many replacements.  Though he missed his old 
friends he knew it was time to make new ones and again enjoyed the camaraderie among these 
“Green” men despite experiences such as being caught off guard by a sudden gas attack.
72
 
 Unfortunately the dissatisfaction of others changed the course of Green’s war experience.  
Kemball’s death brought Lieut.-Col V.V. Harvey to the 54
th
 battalion.  Though Green liked him, 
many did not.  Apparently the colonel made several “foolish” (and never described) mistakes 
during the month of May.  Though Green considered these errors “small” and refused to testify 
against his CO, three senior officers in the battalion felt otherwise and Harvey was ostensibly 
removed because he was an “easterner” in a western battalion, (the truth is far less clear).  
Regardless, Green’s stance left him alienated and he arranged transfer to the 44
th
 battalion under 




  Major E.A. Carey assumed 
command of the 54
th
 on May 21 and decided that until the battalion returned to regular service in 




 A chance to prove his worthiness for promotion arose in late July.  Deployed near Hill 65 
on the Vimy front, B and C Companies entered the front line.  On July 27, B company withdrew 
all but one of its platoons, which passed command of the remaining platoons to Green.  The next 
day Carey ordered the battalion to “push” its outposts closer to the German lines.  At 1800 hours 
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Green ordered sections over the top.  Three outposts were quickly established with little 
opposition.  Over the course of the night one post had to be retaken after suffering continuous 
attacks from the enemy’s infantry.  During subsequent action a fourth “strongpoint” was 
established and one prisoner captured.
75
 
 The young Lieutenant believed he had conducted a successful, though admittedly limited, 
operation.  In his diary he noted that he could have been more aggressive but took pride in only 
suffering two casualties for pushing 150 yards into no-man’s land where “life is worth a lot.”
76
 
However, Carey deemed Green “unfit to command a company and that I [Green] was to come 
away on a course, letting somebody else step in [to command C company].”
77
  Infuriated, Green 
asked for and received permission to transfer from the 54
th
.  Though crestfallen, he received 
solace from his men: 
The men supported me and they told me that they thought I was O.K. and we 
parted friends – every one… It looks rather bad to lose a Company and of course 
promotion.  Really mother dear I am fed up with some of these fellows they don’t 




Green blamed his situation on his passive support for Harvey several months previous. As it 
turned out, this occasion concluded his service as an infantryman. 
 
* * * 
 
Green proceeded to the three-week camp at the Canadian Corps Infantry School as 
ordered, and once again excelled.  He proved particularly adept in bayonet drill where the 
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instructor claimed to be afraid of his prowess.  When the course ended, Green was the only 
student of his class of fifty-five ordered to remain as an Assistant Drill Instructor.  At first Green 
was upset; he wanted to be at the front.  However, he took comfort in continuing to demonstrate 
skills that Carey claimed he lacked.
79
 
 Green struggled with his conscience throughout his stay at the school.  Initially Green 
was only to stay at the camp for one month.  He enjoyed being an instructor, both disciplining 
and encouraging his “company” of men (it was a composite group).  Like any good teacher he 
derived satisfaction from their individual progress but “would just as soon be up the line.”
80
  
However he was unable to leave his new position.  His offer from the 44
th
 seems to have 
evaporated and his application for a staff job also failed to yield any response.  The school still 
needed him, and after serving for a few months his position became permanent.
81
  Green’s 
feelings remained mixed.  Because he was technically on loan from the 54
th
, any promotion 
would come from its headquarters and he knew that as an instructor “the battalion will consider 
me yellow and all that and it means no promotion nor advancement.”
82
  Even though he felt like 
a “miserable piker [quitter],” he decided to stay at the camp and try to work his way into a more 
auspicious position rather than try to transfer back to the 54
th
.  In subsequent months he remained 
an able instructor and enjoyed his time at the camp, but continued to hope to re-enter the front 
lines before the war’s completion.
83
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 The German Spring Offensive of March-April 1918 heightened Green’s guilt for being 
far from the front lines.  He went so far as to appeal to Carey to take him back and after 
commenting that Green was foolish to want to return, the 54
th
’s CO agreed, if there were heavy 
casualties.  However, the Canadian Corps was not targeted by the German assault, thereby 
limiting Canadian casualties and forestalling Green’s wish to return to the front.
84
 
Green’s luck changed in April when his application for a staff position was accepted.  
The appointment as Staff Learner meant the loss of his acting captaincy, but Green did not care; 
the new job was an opportunity to ease his conscience definitively.
85
  Originally assigned to the 
Quartermaster, Green found this work boring and by 23 April managed to secure a transfer to 
Intelligence.
 86
  The learning curve was steep, and he knew it would be a long time before he 
would have any opportunities for promotion, but he found his work extremely “interesting,” and, 
more importantly, he believed he was making a difference.  He wrote intelligence reports, and on 
at least one occasion was present during the interrogation of German POWs.  He frequently 
visited battalions in the field, sometimes visiting the front lines and “OPs” (Observation Posts).  
On one occasion Green was gassed while in the line and there is evidence that he took part in at 
least one patrol.
87
 Green recognized that living conditions at Brigade Headquarters were far 
better than those in the trenches, but his work at the front was more harrowing than that of an 
instructor and he felt he was making a far more valuable contribution to Canada’s war effort.
88
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Green’s superiors agreed and recommended him for promotion to staff captain.  This 
stamp of approval increased his enthusiasm for 6
th
 Brigade and the war, even though final 
confirmation involved a long process requiring months.
89
  He wrote to his father: 
I hope to be in any finishing smash and especially with this Brigade for they can, 
have and will fight in a way that could not be beaten.  The morale is excellent and 
training thorough and the leadership splendid.   Just watch us!   
The dramatic penetration of enemy territory achieved at Amiens in August 1918 justified 
Green’s enthusiasm.  Open warfare complicated communications and Green was often employed 
as a liaison during this period.
90
 Sarcastically, his only complaint was having to “walk fast 
enough to keep up with the hun.”
91
 However he did not forget the cost of these victories writing 
that: “It is hard to look at the dead but such things must be.”  On a more personal note, his friend 
Smith was again wounded and “was not expected to live.”
92
  Nevertheless, Green believed that: 
“The way the offensives are being run this year is much better than ever before and we have 
done much more work with much lighter casualties.  It gives one great confidence and I feel sure 
now that the war will end next year...”
93
 Offensive war, though costly, was paying dividends. 
Green spent the final day of the war east of Mons in the villages of Havre and Boussoit, 
establishing communication lines with signallers.  He noted the casualties of the day, including 
one death, without comment.
94
  Like many of his peers Green was shocked by the war’s sudden 
completion.
95
  Perhaps too startled to share his feelings with family thousands of miles away, he 
confided with his diary: “It was a great day alltho [sic] the armistice made everything so unreal.  
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The hun sat on one side of the valley and we in the bottom of it.  Nobody could realize that the 
war was to all intents and purposes over.”
96
  By 13 November Green managed a very brief letter 
to his mother expressing disbelief, pride in Canada’s contribution, and consolation that she could 
now stop worrying about his safety.
97
  In all the Canadian Corps had advanced 86 miles into 
German occupied territory during the Hundred Days campaign and, despite Canada’s 45,830 




* * * 
 
On 16 November Green’s battalion received instructions to march to Germany as part of 
the initial occupation force.  Canada’s First and Second Divisions, as part of Britain’s Second 
Army received the honour of being part of the march to Bonn and Cologne.  Like most of his 
peers, Green greeted the operation with enthusiasm.
99
  The Canadian Corps began its march two 
days later.  On 4 December Green rode into Germany beside the Brigade’s commander General 
A. Ross as the 29
th
 battalion’s band played “O Canada”.  Rather than despising the war for its 
costs, Green considered it an honour to be part of this march demonstrating Canada’s 
contribution to victory.
100
   
Although Green only spent a few weeks in Germany he seized upon every 
opportunity to humble his former foes in manly fashion.  According to 
regulations, all males from former belligerents had to either salute or remove their 
hats in the presence of British or Canadian officers.  Green commented that: “It 
must have gone against the grain of the Bosche to salute our union jacks.”
101
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By December 10, the 6
th
 Brigade reached Bonn and Green insisted that German males salute him 
despite the fact that the city had not received orders to do so.  When a group of students failed to 
oblige he: 
rode up to one student and told him to take off his hat and as he [the student] 
hesitated[; I] made him hold it right up in the air – just then a street car passed and 
the girl driver turned around and gave me a killing look at and her mouth moved – 
uttering some fierce word.  Oh my but they do love us.
102
 




 Divisions crossed the Rhine with bayonets fixed.  On this 
occasion Sir Arthur Currie received their salute.  Though Green believed in the British sense of 
fair play, he considered himself and his peers “conquerors.”
103
  He was not alone.
104
  Dan 
Dancocks claims that the German population was either shy or friendly, and generally eager to 
obey orders.  Bonn’s population certainly cooperated with its occupation guests, but they 
resented expressions of defeat.  As a prosecutor of these policies, Green described Bonn’s 
population as “unfriendly.”
105
  Though angered when this policy was overturned, Green 
subsequently found his hosts more amicable.
106
 
On December 21, Green accepted a position at General Headquarters (GHQ) at Montreuil 
at the Movements Branch and departed for his new post five days later.  Very little evidence 
survives regarding his specific duties but his central concern was the movement of Canadian 
soldiers from France to England for demobilization in Canada.  He worked with over fifty British 
staff officers so his job was likely specialized.
107
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This prolonged stay in France afforded Green multiple opportunities to tour many of the 
war’s battlefields.  At Vimy he noted that each of the camps sported Canadian names.  Despite 
having witnessed the rubble of Lens on previous occasions, the destruction still impressed him.  
Passing by the area where he had first entered the trenches in 1916, Green recognized a few spots 
but noted that the “face of the country” was marred beyond recognition.   More generally he 
found the utter destruction from years of fighting in the Ypres salient “awful.”
108
  On another trip 
with friends, he stopped at Hill 60 and walked up the hill noting that “it is an awful mess, barb 
wire, busted rifles and even bones[;] of course some very heavy fighting took place there.”  They 
then proceeded to Passchendaele.  Green noted the “obliterated” forests and the commanding 
view of German pillboxes.  Like others, he wondered why the attack had occurred and 
concluded: “The cost was terrible.”
109
  However these experiences did not diminish his 
conviction regarding war’s necessity. 
Despite continued exposure to the sheer destruction of war, Green’s primary concerns lay 
elsewhere.  Many of his gendered ideals remained intact.  Green now smoked a pipe, though he 
promised to stop when he returned home.
110
  He also continued to crave promotion, but remained 
doubtful of his CO’s promise to try to secure one for him in light of the war’s conclusion.  A 
decoration was also unlikely as he realized his service paled in comparison to the sacrifices of 
regular infantry.  Above all, Green did not want “to go home the way I had enlisted with nothing 
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to show for good work.”
111
  He feared the appearance of having failed to distinguish himself and 
continued to crave recognition for his contributions despite telling himself that his conscience 
was clear and that he should be proud regardless of his rank.
112
  In early February he was at last 
promoted to the rank of captain.  Regulations, however, required Green to maintain his status for 
six months prior to being struck off strength in order to gain a captain’s gratuity.  Because his 
promotion was backdated to late December, this meant remaining in the forces until late June.
113
  
Elated, Green could now return home with concrete proof of his worth and contribution to 
victory. 
 Having witnessed war’s terrible cost, Green doubted a lasting peace.  He did not believe 
that “the individual man has become better and wiser as a result of the war and I doubt if we can 
build up a better plan for controlling the world.”
114
  He thought President Woodrow Wilson was 
“very idealistic” and commented: “I think of the misery caused by war and wonder how we can 
prevent wars in the future.  I don’t believe people are big enough to do it.”
115
  Green also noted 
the rise of Bolshevism and believed opposing it would require a “strong hand.”
116
  Instead of a 
League of Nations, he continued to prefer an alliance including England, America, France, Italy 
and Japan as a mechanism to maintain stability.  The war’s victors had demonstrated their 
prowess in coercing peace and he hoped their success would continue.  Writing in his diary on 
the day prior to his departure for England and thereafter to Canada, Green summarized his 
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feelings: “It is the end of what I am sure will prove to be one of the most interesting periods of 




* * * 
 
The preceding narrative corrects two historiographical errors.  First, several factual errors 
have developed regarding Green’s service in the First World War.  Peter Newman claimed Green 
did not venture overseas until 1917, when he had in fact been in England since December 
1915.
118
  Less trivially, several authors have claimed that Green was wounded during the war.  
This myth was likely propagated in interviews with George Ignatieff and has since been 
reiterated by both Erika Simpson and Knowlton Nash.
119
 In his book Ignatieff claims that Green 
communicated the wounded myth as an explanation for inviting two elderly women for tea and 
biscuits during his first visit to Europe since 1919.  If this is what Green said, the lie may have 
been to cover embarrassment for the women’s real association: they may have been some of 
Green’s former girlfriends or the nurses who looked after him when he contracted measles in 
1916.
120
  Either way the lie would have been out of character for Green, who never lied about the 
details of his service throughout his public life.  Alternatively, Green may have provided a vague 
explanation and Ignatieff assumed the rest.  The truth will never be known. 
                                                
117
 Green War Diary, 14 June 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 10. 
118
 Newman, Renegade In Power, 253. 
119
 Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 81; Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 177; Ignatieff, The Making of a Peace 
Monger, 180; Interview with George Ignatieff by Roger Hill et al, date unknown, Canadian Institute for 
International Peace and Security Fonds, Audio recording, LAC RG154 Acc. 1994-0067, ISN 238242, 
Consultation Copy A4 2007-11-0014, track 2. 
120
 Howard Green was an exceptional flirt throughout the majority of the war and dated many Canadian nurses.  His 
relations were always honourable, but he enjoyed female companionship tremendously.  See for example: 
Howard to Mother, 12 March 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 2, 2-3; Howard to Dad, 19 March 1919, 
CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 16, 6-7; Howard to Sister, 30 April 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 
File 17, 1. 
30 
Second, and more interestingly, Green’s war experience has been linked to his later 
advocacy of disarmament.  Michael Tucker believed that Green’s stance was “a likely product of 
his involvement with the war of carnage, the First World War.”
121
  Ignatieff also wrote that 
“above all Green, stirred by memories of the horrors of World War I, found… enthusiastic allies 
in his determined fight for arms control and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”
122
  
Most recently, Jennifer Hunter asserts a similar link.
123
  Unfortunately these claims do not 
describe whether Green became a peacemonger immediately after the war, or whether his 
military service informed his later advocacy of disarmament.  However, neither claim is 
accurate. 
The source of this wartime service myth appears to have originated with George 
Ignatieff.  In an interview Ignatieff claimed that: 
Howard Green, having been a veteran in the First World War, and wounded, and 
seen at an early age what a hell of a thing world war is, was a convinced pacifist 
and was absolutely against the nuclear commitment in any form.  He was for the 
elimination of nuclear weapons.  He’d have been a leader in the peace movement 
if given the chance.
124
 
Erika Simpson later quoted this same passage, adding that Green’s experiences had been 
“horrific.”
125
   Knowlton Nash also interviewed Ignatieff prior to composing his monograph.  
Though war is terrible, Green rarely defined his experiences as horrific and was keenly aware 
that his experience was limited compared to those of infantrymen who fought in the front lines 
throughout the war.  Green had experienced trench warfare, although he was never involved in a 
frontal attack.  He tasted gas, and saw the mass death mechanized warfare could create.  His 
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friends and peers had most notably suffered the futility of trench war at the 1 March gas raid, at 
Vimy, and at the Hundred Days battles.  In the majority of cases, however, Green witnessed 
Canadian soldiers overcoming great odds and successfully taking objectives during the last year 
and a half of the war.  He recognized that bloody sacrifice could yield results.  To him, and the 
vast majority of his Canadian peers, these ends provided sufficient incentive to continue the 
fight.  Though Green did not like war, he did not hate it either: rather, he reluctantly believed in 
it.  As Jonathan Vance observes:  
The Hun had been vanquished, and civilization had been saved from the threat of 
barbarism.  Still, there was no guarantee that the salvation was permanent, and the 
memory of the war accepted that such a struggle might well have to be waged 
again.  In a way, it acted as a powerful antidote to pacifism, for it assumed that the 
truest lovers of peace were those people who were willing to fight for it.
126
 
Like many of his peers, including the subsequent Minister of Defence George Pearkes, or his 
later disarmament advisor E.L.M. Burns (who commanded the 1
st
 Canadian Corps during the 
Italian campaign during the Second World War), the Great War made Green aware of the cost of 
war, but it did not make him a peacemonger.
127
 
Interestingly, Howard Green was asked this heritage question in 1971: 
Mr. Nelson: How did that wartime experience affect you?  Did it give you strong 
feelings about war and the conflict between people and so on or did you… 
Mr. Green: Well for it was a very wonderful experience although I was 
particularly lucky, but it came just at the time in one’s life when impressions were 
made that were very deep and for me it was very beneficial. 
Mr. Nelson: But you didn’t come out with strong feelings for or against war as a 
public policy? 
Mr. Green: Well war is a lot of nonsense.  I mean it is about the worse show of 
union activity you could have, isn’t it?
128
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Green never answered the question satisfactorily.  If his later actions in the 1960s been had 
motivated by his experiences in the First World War one would expect him to have provided a 
strong, clear, affirmative reply.  His first reply could have just as easily been made in reference 
to his university education.  Moreover the second part of his reply is abstract rather than 
reflective of his beliefs in 1919 and only makes negative reference to his experiences as an 
afterthought.  The evidence shows that Green left Europe in 1919 filled with zeal for the British 
Empire and did not consider war a dysfunctional display of unity.  This belief would continue for 
many additional decades. 
 Undoubtedly Green’s beliefs about war changed moderately during the conflict.  Though 
he had enlisted after the battle of 2
nd
 Ypres he did not accurately anticipate the experiences that 
awaited him.  Like most Canadians, Green developed a greater respect and lack of appetite for 
war.   Unsurprisingly, he also expressed great appreciation for the Canadian Corps’ improved 
tactics that reduced casualties and increased effectiveness.  He continued to believe that these 
casualties were justified in light of Germany’s perceived aggression.  Moreover, his continued 
desire for promotion demonstrated his desire to be associated with wartime success.  Above all, 
his sense of duty and justice demanded that he continue to fight for his country and empire 
throughout the war.  The friends and comrades he left behind in France “died in [pursuit of] the 
best cause that anyone could die for.”
129
  He left the First World War with more mature views 
about war, but these views remained favourable to renewed conflict should the international 
situation require it.  War had lost much of its glamour, but to the future peacemonger it had not 
yet lost its utility. 
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Chapter 2: Stilettos 
“The hon. Member of Vancouver-Quadra [Green] is an extraordinary citizen.  He goes around 
the parliament buildings with a smirk on his face, a bible in his hand and a stiletto up his 




Green returned home in July 1919, and like hundreds of thousands of other veterans 
resumed a normal life.  He continued to think positively about the great adventure that he had 
survived.  After meeting a former comrade he composed a letter to his mother in which he 
repeated the narrative of Colonel Kemball’s decision to lead the 54
th
 to what he believed was 
imminent death: “What an inspiration a man like that is.”
2
  Instead of hating war as has been 
alleged by historians of the Diefenbaker period, Green continued to push for increased Canadian 
participation in times of conflict as a necessary and justified part of Canadian foreign policy. 
Having considered several professions during the Great War, Green chose law and 
fulfilled the requirements to write his bar examinations in the fall of 1920, graduating second in 
his class.  Settling in Vancouver, he established his own firm with F.K. Collins (who later 
became a Supreme Court Judge) and hoped that his profession would springboard him into 
politics.
3
  Shortly thereafter he met and married Marion Jean Mounce and fathered two children: 
Lewis and John.  He was also active as a Young Conservative during this period.  By 1930 he 
was President of the Vancouver-South Conservative Association and managed Leon Ladner’s 
unsuccessful bid for that riding’s federal seat.  When a candidate could not be found to run in the 
1935 federal election, Howard Green volunteered.  Though he was not favoured to win, his work 
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in the community, in addition to a visit from R.B. Bennett (the Party’s leader), and a split vote 
between the CCF and Liberals, led to a narrow margin victory of approximately 300 votes.
4
 
Green set out for the first session of Canada’s 18
th
 Parliament in early February 1936. 
Suffering from a self-described “inferiority complex,” he initially resisted urges to speak, or even 
ask questions.  When he finally summoned the courage to give his first brief speech, he “shoved 
[his chair] out in the aisle so that I had room” to fall in case he fainted.
5
  Though this lack of 
confidence continued for some time, Green soon found that he loved “the battle” of debates and 




* * * 
 
From the outset Green took an interest in Veterans Affairs or, as it was then called: 
“returned soldiers problems.”  To some degree he became involved in the subject by default as it 
“was the only thing I knew much about.”
7
  This expertise reaffirmed that Green was aware of the 
costs of war.  From retraining for new professions to caring for the maimed, he was deeply 
interested in the successful reintegration of veterans and despite his later disagreements with the 
Department of Defence, he continued to value the military throughout his life. 
By June of his first year in Parliament, Green delivered a speech asking that the 
parameters of the War Veterans Allowance Act be widened to ensure adequate incomes for 
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veterans who, prior to the age of 60, were either “burnt out” or disabled.
8
  This appeal was 
successful.
9
  Quickly becoming the “Veterans Affairs critic” for the Conservative Party, Green 
was a determined advocate throughout the interwar period for Canadian veterans of all previous 
conflicts.
10
  His efforts were appreciated: he received a marble desk set complete with a 
nameplate from widows grateful for his assistance in obtaining the pensions of their deceased 
husbands.  Though he regretted that the widows had resorted to such extravagance, he knew the 
item could not be returned.
11
   
Although Green fought the so-called “second battle” with vigour,
12
 his concerns were 
quickly eclipsed by the failure of appeasement to prevent a Second World War.  Like others, 
Green noted the increasing probability of war and, and as a spokesman for his constituency and 
his country, lobbied for increased defences.
13
  Although there was little that Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King could have done to change the course of international events, Green continued 
to find King’s foreign policy frustrating:. He wrote to his father in April 1939, “he [King] has so 
many ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ and grunts and groans that I consider him a positive menace to the 
Canadian people.”
14
 King’s government initiated a modest rearmament program, but Green 
believed it should have done more.
15
  Initially his lobbying took the form of moderate requests 
for increased anti-aircraft and mounted naval guns on the West coast,
16
 but as Japanese victories 
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mounted, so did Green’s requests.  He described Canada as being at a “forked road” where it had 
to choose whether it would defend itself or allow others to do so, thus relegating it to obscurity.
17
  
He urged the immediate construction of a strong Canadian Navy and encouraged its presence on 
the Pacific Coast.  The Vancouverite even suggested borrowing reserve ships from Britain until 
Canadian replacements could be constructed.  In a similar vein, Green advocated joining a 
defensive alliance with Pacific Commonwealth countries as well as the United States.
18
  He also 
requested the creation of “dominion arsenals” to ensure sufficient production of infantry, light 
artillery and anti-aircraft guns at any war’s outset.
19
  In short, Green advocated anything that 
would deter an external threat or, if that failed, would make a war more winnable.  To his 
surprise few took his more radical suggestions seriously.
20
  
 When it became clear that war was imminent in late August 1939, Green’s mood was 
mixed.  On the one hand he was “depressed… and unable to grasp the terrible truth that this 
world is almost into another war” and wondered “whether our civilization deserves to continue.”  
On the other hand: 
Its seems perfectly clear that someone, sometime has to smash this madman Hitler 
and the sooner it is done the easier the job will be…  I am certain that there will 
have to be real leadership shown [by the government] and great steadiness in our 




After Canada declared war on Germany on September 10, Green repeated his hope that the war 
would make Canada a better nation.
22
  To Green, war remained a necessary part of foreign policy 
and could lead to a country’s betterment; although he despised the deaths war would bring, he 
did not view it as an evil to be avoided at all costs. 
                                                
17
 Ibid, 13 May 1938, 2874. 
18
 Ibid, 2875, 3 April 1939, 2555. 
19
 Ibid, 10 March 1939, 1784-1787; 16 May 1939, 4131, 4134, 4139, 4151-4152. 
20
 Howard to John, 15 May 1938, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 4, 6. 
21
 Howard to Folks, 27 August 1939, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 1, 1-2. 
22
 Howard to Little Woman (Marion), 13 September 1939, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 3.  
37 
 Green believed that nothing short of a “total war effort” would suffice.
23
  He remained 
frustrated by Mackenzie King’s cautious policies designed to maintain national unity.  Green’s 
two primary areas of concern were economic mobilization and manpower.  He often asked 
questions in Parliament about the status of military equipment production in Canada.  In May 
1940, for example, he asserted that Canada required the capacity to equip its own troops with 
gear, and went on to claim that if Britain fell on hard times “we [Canada] may have to become 
the arsenal of the British empire.”
24
  More generally Green asked that Canadian industrial 
capacity be used to its fullest extent, and sought to ensure that sufficient personnel were available 
for continuous production.  Though the government assured Green that production difficulties 
were only slight, Green repeatedly advocated industrial training for women and older men so that 
those eligible to fight would be free to do so.  This would ensure more full and efficient 
deployment of Canada’s human resources.  These demands were issued in advance of the mass 
deployment of Canadian troops and Green’s requests evaporated when worker shortages became 
a real problem.
25
  Green’s attention, like other Conservatives, changed to conscription for 
overseas service where he again pushed for maximized commitment. 
After Canada declared war, Green believed that Mackenzie King was not going to send 
troops overseas.  King’s address to Parliament on September 7 failed to promise the creation of a 
Canadian Expeditionary Force and Green believed that the Prime Minister opposed this measure.  
Green’s party feared that King was creating the impression that Canada only subscribed to a 
“half-heated” war effort and Green joined the push for an overseas contingent.  Even if Britain 
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did not require it immediately, he felt such a force would eventually be required and because 
battalions took time to raise and train.  Indeed, the King government originally hoped to fight a 
war of “limited liability” and Green opposed any restraint.
26
  “Freedom” was threatened and he 
believed Canada had to do everything in its power to aid its mother country.
27
 
The excitement of mass enlistments quickly swept across most of Canada, and Green was 
not immune.  By December 1939, Green watched Vancouver’s Seaforth Highlanders march 
through the city before embarking on the long journey east, then overseas.  He recognized the 
second-in-command as well as many of the other officers, and remarked that the sight was “sad 
but inspiring – the ordinary people are the ones who pay the price in these wars.”  However 
despite this concern he added that: “today for the first time I wished I had stayed in the Militia – 
but I did not dream that there would be another war.”
28
  Saddened that he could not take part, he 
hoped that he would be able to go to England and France as part of a Parliamentary Committee at 
some future date.
29
  Although Green realized that many would die in the war, this did not cause 
him to oppose Canada’s part in the conflict.  In fact, this consideration led him to pursue it 
doggedly. 
When bad news arrived from Europe in May and June 1940, Green again demanded a 
more whole-hearted war effort.  The Liberal government enacted the National Resource 
Mobilization Act (NMRA), which included conscription for home defence.  Thus Canada’s 
Army was split between General Service volunteers who could serve abroad, and NRMA 
conscripts who would only be asked to serve in Canada.  Civilians could enlist under either 
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  Green was frustrated by this noticeable limit to full service and continued to push for 
more overseas troops.  In the House he demanded that Canada raise a third division and that 
“recruiting should be thrown wide open so that every fit Canadian wishing to serve in our 
fighting forces may do so.”
31
  He believed that Canada would require “a million men” in uniform 
to defend itself at home and abroad.
32
 Privately, he believed that conscription would soon be 




It was not until early 1942, when the Liberals announced a national plebiscite to release 
the government from its pledge not to send conscripts overseas, that the Conservative Party 
began to lobby openly for conscription.  Like many in his party, Green believed that the 
plebiscite was another way for the Liberal government to avoid taking responsibility for its 
decisions. He believed that the prime minister was “thinking more of retaining votes for his party 
in Quebec than he is of strengthening our war effort.”
34
  Furthermore, to Green, overseas 
conscription was a symbolic measure of Canada’s commitment to the war.
35
  Green hoped that 
Canada’s population would discern this scheme and support a Conservative campaign for 
conscription.  
When the “yes” vote prevailed in all but Quebec, the Liberals possessed the power, but 
lacked either the will or justification, to invoke conscription.  At the time, Canada’s manpower 
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needs were not dire and conscription was not an immediate necessity.
36
  Green thought otherwise 
and found the government’s reinforcement program ambiguous and detrimental to the war effort.  
He complained that individuals eligible to serve did not know whether they would be conscripted 
and thus found it difficult to find jobs in war industry.
37
 Concerned for his Pacific constituency, 
he lobbied for NRMA personnel to be part of the Pacific offensive campaign that would have to 
be fought both to secure Canada’s security and to “avenge Hong Kong.”
38
  More generally Green 
favoured conscription because it afforded “equality of sacrifice among young men, because a 
young man may [currently] choose whether he will serve where he is needed or at home in 
Canada.”
39
  Again, Green believed the government’s policy compromised the war effort by 
placating Quebec at the expense of the wishes of English Canada.  He was not alone.  As C.P. 
Stacey points out, the plebiscite results were not necessarily a wholehearted endorsement of 
conscription by English Canada.  Arthur Meighen’s failed by-election campaign was based on a 
platform of full conscription for overseas service .  It seems more likely that, as J.L. Granatstein 
and J.M. Hitsman suggest, many in English Canada believed they had released the government 
from non-conscription rather than demanding mandatory overseas service.  Green was vaguely 
aware of this political manoeuvring, but dismissed it as a distortion of the vote.  He thought 




Green’s discontent was most obvious in his bid for leadership of the Conservative Party 
in 1942.  He was often frustrated when his own party failed to push as hard as he wanted for a 
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more total war effort, including full conscription.
41
  He knew that victory was beyond his reach 
but a leadership bid provided him with a platform to voice his concerns.
42
  In subsequent 
interviews, Green claimed that he ran to protest what amounted to the coronation of Manitoba 
Progressive premier John Bracken.  Green resented that Bracken was overwhelmingly preferred 
despite being “from the outside” as he was not a Member of Parliament.  Bracken even insisted 
that the party rename itself the “Progressive Conservatives” to accommodate Bracken’s former 
political allegiance.
43
  However, Green’s convention seemed disastrous.  Slightly underweight, 
tall, extremely nervous, and lacking any supper, Green took the stage to give his nomination 
acceptance speech -- only to pass out mid-sentence.
44
  Despite coming in a distant fourth place 
on the first ballot and giving only brief follow-up remarks, the episode seems to have helped 
rather than hindered Green’s political future.  Having demonstrated his concern for the war 
effort, it was also clear that he would not run again.  Therefore Green was a safe weapon to 
deploy in the House of Commons.  Green’s position in the frontlines of the now Progressive 
Conservative Party was assured. 
Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, initiated the Italian campaign that 
generated the first serious test of Canada’s reinforcement policy.  At the time, the event 
prompted Green to reminisce about Canada’s successful attack on Vimy Ridge (where he did not 
fight) and, as at the start of the war, he thought of both the casualties and the glory that would 
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result from Canada’s involvement.
45
  Throughout this period, he continued to ask for Canadian 
troops to fight in the Pacific theatre, but with little effect.  The Minister of Defence J.L. Ralston 
correctly pointed out that Canada’s contribution of units had peaked and that any troops 
remaining in Canada would either be used for home defence or reinforcement purposes; no 
further divisions would be sent abroad.  Ralston still insisted that volunteerism was a sufficient 
method of reinforcement and that Canada was doing as much as it could but Green continued to 
demand a more total war effort.
 46
 
Combat in Italy and subsequently in Northwest Europe after the invasion of France in 
June 1944 soon drained Canada of sufficient replacements for infantry losses.  Since the very 
outset of the war, Green had lobbied for the complete training of Canada’s soldiers based on his 
own war experience: 
I have all of the old soldier’s horror of rushing half-trained men into war, which 
would mean not giving these fine young Canadians who will compose the 




Moreover, because Green had pushed for conscription for well over a year, the current shortage 
seemed inexcusable.  Since the summer of 1944, the government had sought to re-muster non-
infantry soldiers to fill the shortages amongst the infantry. When Ralston resigned in early 
November 1944, King installed General A.G.L. McNaughton as Minister of Defence to attempt 
to salvage a volunteer service model.
48
  A personal dimension was added to Green’s frustration 
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when his son Lewis was converted in July 1944 from artillery to infantry with significantly less 
training than NRMA conscripts.
49
 
Entering Parliament on November 23, Green embarked on a line of questioning that more 
closely resembled a prosecutor cross-examining a witness.  On repeated occasions he asked 
McNaughton to either deny or verify that General Service clerks were being sent to the front 
with between six and eight weeks training while NRMA troops with full training remained in 
Canada.  After considerable sparring Green asked whether, in an emergency, untrained personnel 
would be rushed to the front.  The Minister of National Defence finally admitted: “Under those 
conditions, when the fate of the battle depends on it, it is the duty of every man, regardless of his 
qualifications or training, to do the best he can.”  Rebuking the Minister, Green replied: 
“Government members are applauding.  What does the general think the duty of the men who are 
in the home defence army fully trained in combat training should be?”  To this McNaughton 
could only feebly repeat the government’s increasingly dubious hope that NRMA men would 
volunteer for General Service abroad.
50
 Again, Green wanted a total war effort, with equality of 
sacrifice.  Though he had no love for war, he did not fear casualties.  Rather, like the last war, he 
could only justify them under certain conditions: and inexperience was unacceptable. 
 After Germany surrendered in May 1945, Green continued to call for mandatory overseas 
deployment in the Pacific.  The Liberal government preferred a limited Canadian role and 
planned to send a single volunteer division (compared to five in Europe) to the north Pacific.  
The Liberal policy, derived from the country’s overall domestic mood, would have resulted in 
another reinforcement shortage had the division been deployed in serious operations for any 
considerable period.  (This was not the case, of course, and it is possible that any of King’s fears 
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were lessened by personal knowledge of the American atomic bomb project.)
51
  But Green had 
strongly encouraged Canadian involvement in the Pacific theatre throughout the war and he 
argued that it should now focus its resources on the remaining belligerent.  He asked that NRMA 
men be used so that veterans from the European theatre would not have to fight again.  At the 
very least he hoped that NRMA men would be sent to Europe to relieve general service troops so 
that Canada would make a larger contribution to the Allied assault in the Pacific.
52
  These views 
coincided with his party’s platform; however the proposal found little favour outside of British 
Columbia.  According to J.L. Granatstein, it “reinforced the impression that the Conservatives 
were bloodthirsty.”
53
  As a BC MP, this impression mattered little to Green.  His continued push 
reflected his genuine belief that continued fighting was necessary for the security of Canada’s 
Pacific coast. 
 Like the First World War, Green’s experiences in the Second World War did little to 
change his views on armed conflict.  Throughout the war, he believed that armed conflict was a 
necessary part of foreign policy that, when required, be pursued to the fullest extent possible.  
Where Prime Minister King constrained Canada’s war effort to ensure that Canada’s contribution 
did not compromise Canadian unity, Green continued to believe that his own perspective was 
correct and in fact reflected the majority of Canadians.  While this was an accurate assessment of 
the mood in British Columbia, it overestimated the willingness of the vast majority of Canadians 
for continuing the fight.  Again, far from detesting war, Green was more willing than most 
Canadians to see the war to its full conclusion.
54
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* * * 
 
 Hope for the war’s successful conclusion restarted significant consideration of veterans’ 
affairs in the House of Commons. The Liberal government had begun modest contemplation of 
veterans’ concerns as early as December 1939, and had continued under the guidance of Ian 
Mackenzie and other officials throughout the war.
55
 Green continued to speak on veterans’ 
subjects throughout the war, focusing particularly on veterans returning from the new war prior 
to its conclusion as well as dependents of men in the armed forces.  But these debates proved 
minor compared to other issues such as conscription.
56
   As Green himself described in April 
1945: 
During these last five years [the Second World War] the main job of Canada and 
of the Canadian parliament has been to wage war; but complementary to the 
waging of war there is always the care of those who are doing the fighting, and 
care for their dependents.  I suggest to hon. Members that the time will be here 
very soon when the first concern of the Canadian people and of the Canadian 




Green understood that Parliament’s duties in wartime extended to soldiers’ lives both on and off 
the battlefield.  Part of Green’s contribution to the war was therefore managing its successful 
dénouement. 
During the immediate post-war period, Green’s efforts pertaining to veterans were 
concentrated in the Special Committee on Veteran’s Affairs. Walter S. Woods described the 
Committee’s task of creating what amounted to the “Veteran’s Charter” (a collection of 
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legislation to ease the resettlement of veterans into civilian life and ensure an adequate livelihood 
thereafter) as nothing short of “Herculean.”
58
  Green attended virtually every all of the 
Committee’s meetings from 1945-1946, which sometimes exceeded three in a single week.  
Green enjoyed the work and believed he was making a real contribution to its proceedings.
59
 
Green, and many, if not all of his peers generally agreed with the government’s legislative 
program.  As such, Green participated in few weighty or extended debates in the Special 
Committee on Veterans Affairs.  Instead of accepting the legislation as sufficient, however, 
Green dug deeper, looking for exceptions, or possible unintended consequences of the proposed 
legislation.   
For instance, Green took repeated exception to the phrase “wilfully concealed” in the 
Pensions Act.  The pension provided funds to persons disabled during the course of service in 
Canada’s armed forces.  If a veteran knowingly hid a pre-existing condition at the time of 
enlistment that would have resulted in the state refusing their services, and that condition was 
exacerbated to the point of debility by their service, the state held that the veteran was not 
entitled to a full pension.  Of course an enlistee would likely hide a condition to maximize his / 
her chances of acceptance.  In addition, it was often difficult to prove whether a person was 
aware that previous symptoms posed a real health risk.  Alternatively, a veteran could have 
hidden a precondition and after the war filed for a pension without suffering any added debility 
from his / her service.  Of course, very few individuals would enlist with the hopes of securing a 
pension in the future but the possibility of post-war exploitation existed nevertheless.  A heated 
debate ensued regarding whether veterans were more likely to be protected by this phrase or 
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penalized by it. Green used his Great War experience to inform his views admitting that he had 
had to look through cracks between his fingers when taking an eye exam prior to enlistment for 
the First World War and that he did not think that the state should penalize men who hid personal 
deficiencies so that they could serve their country.
60
 Many in the committee agreed with him.  
Eventually, Green’s motion that the words “wilfully concealed” be removed from the legislation 
was put to a vote and carried 18 to 16.
61
  However a few weeks later Leslie Mutch (Winnipeg 
South) moved that the words “wilfully and deliberately concealed” be added, with the obvious 
intent of ensuring that those who had intentionally concealed debilities be penalized while those 
who had not been aware of their condition remained protected.
62
  Whether a compromise or not, 
Green continued to feel that veterans were treated as guilty until proven innocent and continued 
to lobby, albeit with limited vigour and regularity, for a fuller reversal of this principle.
63
 
An aspect of Veterans Affairs that received more stubborn attention from Green was 
Merchant Seamen; indeed an article by Don Mason declared Green their “champion.”
64
  These 
men had served in the merchant marine sailing ships in convoys during the Second World War.  
Because they remained civilians, they were only apportioned partial benefits.
65
  Noting the high 
casualty rates among this force, Green lobbied throughout the 1940s and 1950s for Merchant 
Mariners to receive fuller benefits under the Veterans Charter.  Several particular Acts received 
continued attention.  Perhaps Green’s most frequent request was that these men be fully eligible 
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for vocational training under the Veteran’s Rehabilitation Act.
66
  Green frequently complained 
that Canada’s merchant marine was shrinking and this left mariners without work.
67
  Similarly, 
he lobbied that these men be eligible for pensions on the same grounds as Veterans.  Merchant 
Mariners were not under the “Insurance Principle” that underlay all legislation in the Veteran’s 
Charter, which briefly put, ensured coverage for all veterans for any debility incurred while 
serving, regardless of whether it was received in combat or not.  As such, the dependents of a 
mariner who died after falling overboard from a ship in London during a blackout could not 
collect his pension.  Green repeatedly asked that pensions be more readily accessible to these 
men and their families.
68
  To him, these individuals deserved better. 
Green respected his comrades in arms, past and present, and though this may not be 
surprising, it is worth noting in light of his later opposition to the Department of Defence.  In the 
1940s Green continued to believe that Canadians needed to serve in war and that the state held 
an obligation to care for them as well as their loved ones after their service was complete.  By 
drawing on his own military experience to inform his views about veterans’ policy he persevered 
on numerous occasion for particular interests that he felt had been overlooked. 
 
* * * 
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 The end of the war naturally also changed Canadian politics and diplomacy.  Given 
Green’s later “obsession” with disarmament while SSEA, it is interesting to note that his focus 
on atomic energy and weaponry developed long before 1959.
69
 Erika Simpson has written that: 
Exposure to information about the dangers of limited nuclear war and the effects 
of nuclear and conventional weapons of mass destruction impelled many Critics 
to oppose the buildup of both sides’ defence systems.  Such exposure included 
belated reports about the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientific studies 
about the global effects of ‘nuclear winter,’ and revelations about the inadequacy 
of civilian defence in case o f a nuclear, chemical, or biological war.  Critics 
found information surfacing about the effects of a nuclear explosion difficult to 
ignore… The opposition of Howard Green and Norman Robertson to nuclear 
weapons was partly based on their exposure in the late 1950s to the disturbing 
facts about the dangers of nuclear war.  As Basil Robinson explains, both Green 
and Robertson were exposed to the anti-nuclear arguments propounded in the 




Simpson’s footnotes only concern Robertson and, while Green’s ultimate decision to advocate 
disarmament did stem from studies from the late 1950s concerning fallout (see chapter 3), he 
acquired exceptional knowledge about atomic weaponry more than a decade earlier.  
Surprisingly, this early knowledge did not make him a peacemonger. 
Throughout the war the only Canadians aware of the American Manhattan project to 
develop a nuclear devise were C.J. Mackenzie (until 1944 Acting) President of the National 
Research Council, who served as the chief bureaucrat of Canada’s early atomic development; 
C.D. Howe; and the Prime Minister.  It was only with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in August 1945 that the rest of Canada, and the world, were alerted to a new era in 
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   After the war’s conclusion, Howe quickly announced that Canada would not 
develop the atomic bomb, but would continue work to harness the atom for peaceful purposes.
72
 
Although futile, international events moved at a rapid pace. Nuclear weapons were a 
major concern at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946.  These 
discussions created the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) to consider the 
question of nuclear disarmament. It was composed of all members of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) and Canada.  In this early example of “functionalism,” Canada’s 
expertise in nuclear technology, as a leading supplier of uranium, and having built the first 
operational reactor outside of the United States, made it an important atomic player.  It was thus 
the only power to be guaranteed a seat regardless of whether it currently served on the UNSC, 
and Canada’s representative, General A.G.L. McNaughton, often played a prominent role in the 
negotiations.  However, these talks quickly stalled despite McNaughton’s conciliatory initiatives.  
Though it was not entirely appreciated at the time, the difference was partly due to a fundamental 
conflict in interests.  The United States, then enjoyed an atomic monopoly and was extremely 
reluctant to surrender their atomic warheads to international control unless they could be 
reasonably sure that no other power (particularly the USSR) was developing its own nuclear 
program.  Thus the Western Allies focused on what came to be known as “control” measures to 
police any atomic disarmament agreement.  Such measures would include regular inspections of 
all potential nuclear powers.  The USSR on the other hand, possessed a crash atomic program 
and viewed the Western proposals as little more than “legalized espionage.”  The USSR 
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therefore asked for nothing short of the immediate destruction of all nuclear weapons.  Because 
the USSR maintained a vast army, the destruction of the American nuclear monopoly would 
strengthen its position against Western Europe.  This weaponry difference continued and 
therefore perpetuated the West’s calls for control and the USSR’s desire for disarmament.
73
  The 
degree to which Green understood this dichotomy is difficult to determine, but he was at least 
aware of these early negotiations.  However his interest in nuclear technology was limited to its 
production and development rather than disarmament.  
In 1946 Green began what became a crusade for parliamentary education in atomic 
energy technology.  When C.D. Howe (then Minister of Reconstruction and Supply) proposed 
legislation to create the Atomic Energy Control Board, Green asked what role Parliament would 
have in atomic research and vaguely suggested the creation of a parliamentary committee.  Upon 
second reading a week later, Green provided a more elaborate supporting argument and request.  
His speech posed many thought-provoking questions ranging from international agreements to 
patents, crown companies, and the creation of a “watchdog” committee.  Green realized that the 
body, if created, would not wield supreme authority due to necessary secrecy as well as its 
limited expertise, but he felt the body’s creation would educate legislators and result in more 
informed policy formulation.   This pertained to both military and civilian applications of atomic 
energy.  In the United States three committees monitored the atomic industry and Green saw no 
reason why at least one body could not be created in Canada.  His request received support from 
many and all agreed that his points were worthy of further consideration. Howe, however, 
refused to relent and the bill passed without a committee being formed.
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Early in the 1947 Green continued his push for the creation of a special committee, which 
Howe considered ill-advised due to the “very sensitive” nature of atomic research.  However he 
promised to discuss the matter with the government and reply late in the session.
75
  During the 
session Green, as a member of the Standing Committee on External Affairs, attended a meeting 
where General McNaughton was questioned about Canada’s role in the UNAEC and the nature 
of atomic warfare.  McNaughton described in minute detail how the destruction of atomic 
weapons derived from the initial blast and subsequent suction wave.  He then described the heat 
created by the weapon that would reach approximately “5,000,000 degrees centigrade… it 
destroys their skin, it destroys their eyes.”  Lastly he described the subsequent gamma ray 
radiation that would penetrate “a nine or ten foot concrete wall and still knock a man out.”
76 
  
These comments naturally spawned questions regarding decontamination.  McNaughton’s 
answer was mixed: he admitted that decontamination was possible but cautioned his audience 
against assumptions of an easy or complete fix.
77
  The general’s comments regarding further 
advancements in weapons technology were grim: 
…the actual efficiency of the explosion of the [atomic] bombs that were exploded 
at Nagasaki was only a fraction of 1 per cent of the total energy of mass in the 
bombs, and it would be highly unlikely if, with further engineering developments, 
its efficiency were not multiplied several fold.
78
 
An even more earnest response was evoked when Thomas Kidd (Kingston) asked: 
Q[uestion] - …if an enemy, whoever it might be, entered into chemical and 
bacteriological warfare, are we going to be in a position to counteract that and 
meet them on the same ground? - A[nswer]. I am going to ask not to answer that 
if I may. 
Q[uestion] – You could say it off the record? – A[nswer]. No I dare not answer it. 
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The lengthy and sombre meeting surely impressed upon Green the stakes involved in any future 
conflict.  He did not ask a single question during the meeting.  Whether Green had prepared 
questions cannot be known, but what is certain is that he was content to sit and absorb the 
disturbing insights of Canada’s disarmament negotiator. 
The meeting also solidified Green’s conviction that parliament needed to be better 
informed about atomic technology.  By July Green grew impatient and inferred that Atomic 
Energy Canada was operating without any parliamentary control.   Again he demanded the 
creation of a watchdog committee.  Howe continued to play for time, asking that “the matter be 
allowed to stand… for another year, and that, at the next session I shall be glad to review the” the 
government’s position on the creation of a committee.
80
  Green relented, though he again found 
supporters during the debate. 
 Green continued to bide his time until June 1948 when he pushed yet again for the 
creation of a special committee.  On this occasion Howe downplayed the importance of Canada’s 
atomic energy program, insisting that because of its purely peaceful focus there were “no great 
decisions to make.”  Recognizing that the parliamentary sessions was in its closing days, Green 
acknowledged that nothing could be done immediately, but again asked that consideration be 
given to the creation of such a committee in the next parliament.
81
  When Green again 
recommended a watchdog committee on atomic energy in 1949, Howe interjected that “the 
government would have no objection to the creation of such a committee.”
82
  Prolonged 
discussions regarding the committee’s size and composition ensued and as Howe “is quite fussy 
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about who goes on.”
83
 In October 1949 the Special Committee on the Operations of the Atomic 
Energy Control Board was finally created and Green took the opportunity to make what might 
be termed a “victory speech” wherein he recalled his crusade and the major reasons for the 
creation of the committee, including the recent detonation of an atomic device by the USSR.
84
  
Though he was clearly aware of the military potential of the weapons, Green’s primary 
justification throughout his crusade focused on parliamentary oversight rather than the possibility 
of war and international diplomacy. 
 The committee met in early November and over the following month received a lengthy 
and remarkably frank briefing from C.J. Mackenzie  (President of the National Research 




  Though he 
warned the committee that the majority of what he shared could not be published, he would 
answer any questions to the fullest extent of his ability.  The brief included a detailed history of 
the development of Canada’s uranium and atomic industries.  The most striking feature of this 
brief and the question it spawned is just how little Canada’s parliamentarians knew about atomic 
energy as their questions were often thoughtful, though rudimentary.  What was heavy water? 
What were the differences between Canada’s atomic program and the United Kingdom’s?  How 
did the federal government manage uranium prospecting?  In every case Mackenzie provided 
patient answers in layman’s terms wherever possible, repeating himself when necessary. Even 
with this care, several commented that there was simply too much knowledge to absorb.
86
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 The committee then ventured to Chalk River (the centre of Canada’s atomic research) for 
a two-day visit on November 16 and 17.  The meeting was “off the record” and is rarely 
mentioned in the minutes of subsequent meetings.  However, like Mackenzie, Chalk River’s 
employees were instructed to answer all the questions posed by MPs.
87
 Contrary to Green’s 
modesty and admiration for the employees of Chalk River (he claimed to have been “more 
confused than ever” by the trip
88
), the trip informed his subsequent concerns and his questions 
became more policy based.  He asked about the degree to which isotopes were being employed 
in industry and what policies were in place to facilitate their wider use.  Was Canada’s atomic 
program more focused on development or pure research? Were American secrecy laws 
disadvantaging Canada’s atomic industry or limiting Western advances relative to that of the 
Soviet Union?  The latter question again prompted off the record discussion.
89
  Though Green 
generally focused on civilian aspects of atomic energy, others asked about military aspects.  For 
instance: could radiation fallout be removed from warships?
90
  Again Green demonstrated no 
unusual concern about atomic warfare and in fact was more interested in its civil applications. 
 Green’s concern for atomic technology continued throughout the remainder of his time in 
Opposition.  He continued to press for another Special Committee on Atomic Energy.  Even after 
suggesting that the committee only examine civilian matters to prevent security infringements, 
C.D. Howe continued to resist.
91
  However in 1953 the committee was established and focused 
on civilian concerns.  Green spoke on a variety of subjects and again expressed concern about 
the limits on the exchange of information between Canada and the United States due to the 
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McMahon Act and how it could compromise Canada’s competitive edge in the international 
civilian market (rather than proliferation).
92
  In the end even this committee failed to satisfy 
Green’s appetite for knowledge on atomic advancements.  Over the proceeding years he repeated 
asked for the House to create a Standing Committee to investigate atomic developments.
93
  As 
might be expected these requests were not taken seriously as a Standing Committee would have 
been a remarkable step and given the limited size of Canada’s program.  Nevertheless, Green’s 
concern regarding atomic energy is worth nothing. 
Green’s education in atomic technology Green was unparalleled for non-scientists in 
Canada.  Yet his attitudes regarding war were not refashioned by his awareness of the 
fundamental change in weaponry taking place among the militaries of the great powers.  While 
he might have realized that the limited number of warheads available meant that humanity would 
survive a nuclear war for the time being this does not explain his silence in the mid and late 
1950s when the Soviets possessed many more warheads.  Regardless, despite this knowledge his 
views on the viability and even survivability of war remained intact. 
 
* * * 
 
 Green was also active throughout this period in the field of External Affairs.  Many 
writers discussing Green’s appointment as SSEA have described him as naïve.  For instance, 
Peter Newman describes Green as having possessed “little interest in world affairs” and many 
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authors cite Green’s limited travelling from 1919 to 1959 as evidence of this disinterest.
94
  In 
reality, this fact was not indicative of disinterest in external affairs and was instead the result of 
several causes.  In 1945 he had hoped to go to San Francisco for the opening sessions of the 
United Nations, but he knew more prominent members of the party would “elbow” him out.  In 
the same letter he expressed his annoyance at not going on a trip “overseas” with party leader 
John Bracken: “As you know I have taken the head in external affairs and it will be awkward for 
them to be passive if more than one Conservative is to go.”
95
  On another occasion he was 
pressured by his party to be a delegate to the Empire Parliamentary Association convening in 
Bermuda but refused because he did not think the meeting would discuss anything substantial.  
Furthermore he did not want to miss an upcoming debate in the House of Commons.
96
  Lastly, 
maintaining a home in Vancouver and an apartment in Ottawa required him to continue to work 
as a lawyer when Parliament was not in session.
97
  Thus Green’s extremely limited travels should 
not be equated with disinterest in international affairs. 
A few authors cite Green’s nine-year membership on the Standing Committee on 
External Affairs to challenge this alleged ignorance, but it is doubtful that they examined the 
committee’s minutes.
98
 Green initially failed to attend any of the meetings since other 
commitments (particularly the Special Committee on Veterans Affairs) demanded most of his 
attention.  He was not able to attend a meeting of the Standing Committee on External Affairs 
until June 1947, over one-and-a-half years after his appointment to the committee and it is likely 
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that Green made time for this particular meeting because General McNaughton was being 
questioned about Canada’s role on the UNAEC (see above).
99
  Green had been aware of schedule 
conflict from the outset but still agreed to serve.
100
  That Green remained on the committee 
despite this continuing schedule conflict demonstrated a personal as well as party interest in 
keeping him as informed as possible.  At the very least, membership on the committee afforded 
access to its minutes and thereby helped him to remain informed on the subject. However, 
several key aspects of his foreign policy remained underdeveloped and even naïve. 
Green’s conception of Canada’s place in the international arena has been the subject of 
ridicule and though the following does not directly pertain to the development of his beliefs 
about war, it provides the background for Green’s famous comments during the Suez crisis and 
more relevantly provides critical insights into the development of the diplomatic strategies that 
he would subsequently deploy when fighting for disarmament.   
Green often referred to Canada as a “world power.”  It is important not to dismiss this 
statement as mere rhetoric (as some have done
101
) since Green was never foolish enough to 
expect Canada to become a superpower.  Borrowing the phrase from a  speech made by 
Mackenzie King on Canada Day in 1943, Green provided his own definition:
 102
 
[First,] a foreign policy is required that will give the Canadian people a vision of 
their nation taking a stand on world questions as they arise, and not simply 
waiting outside the door for some of the larger nations to hand out a decision.  
Canada herself must take a stand on world questions as they arise.  Secondly, a 
vision of Canada boldly acting for the sort of world that Canadians believe in as 
individuals.  Thirdly, Canada must be willing to assume her fair share of 
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responsibilities, of whatever burdens there may be entailed in order that a better 
world may be developed after this war.
103
 
Few would disagree with a policy advocating that Canada pursue its own interests towards a 
more peaceful.  However Green was not yet finished speaking. 
Green then endeavoured to expand on this definition and buried himself in contradiction.  
First he suggested that Canada “develop within the British commonwealth [sic]” and that “the 
British family of nations should speak with one voice in foreign affairs.”  He suggested this 
because he recognized that Canada’s influence would be limited if it remained outside a 
multilateral framework and therefore hoped that Canada could at least partially wield a more 
weighty Commonwealth voice.
104
  As Lord Halifax subsequently discovered (as the British 
wartime Ambassador to Washington), suggestions implying a unified Commonwealth foreign 
policy were generally unpopular in Canada.
105
  However Green’s conception of Canada’s place 
in the world was not merely based in anglophile sympathies.  He also prescribed working with 
the United States and went so far as to advocate Canadian membership in the Pan-American 
Union “it being understood of course that we are not to be taken thereby as weakening our 
connection with the British commonwealth [sic] of nations.”
106
  He also hoped to join a world 
organization (the UN was not yet been fully conceived).  On this occasion Brooke Claxton 
(Minister of National Defence) took Green to task.  He explained that the Commonwealth 
included regions across the globe with a wide variety of different, and possibly conflicting 
interests.  While he advocated consultation and hoped that agreement could be reached, 
expecting unanimity was absurd.  He went on to point out that a single Commonwealth foreign 
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policy would also preclude Canada’s membership in other organizations such as the Pan-
American Union as their interests were bound to eventually conflict.
107
 
This last criticism is important in that it highlights the conflict in Green’s foreign policy 
as he then conceived it.  His ideas were not entirely thought out, and were at times contradictory.  
If his speech and defence is read as a whole rather than as the sum of its parts (as Claxton did), 
however, it is clear that Green wanted Canada to be an independent actor, working within 
international organizations whose policies coincided with Canada’s. Undoubtedly Green was 
overzealous about the Commonwealth and would have been disappointed had he pursued the 
policy he suggested, but he would not let it constrain Canadian foreign policy.  Independence of 
action was Green’s underlying argument.  He felt able to advocate such a policy because he 
continued to believe that the interests of Canada and Britain (and indeed the Commonwealth 
itself) were intertwined.  Green did discover the falsity of this belief when he became SSEA, but 
at that time he remained divided: intellectually, like most Canadians, Green was a multilateralist; 
emotionally he remained an anglophile.  
The threat of communism similarly divided Green’s thoughts.  One of Green’s ongoing 
concerns was the spread of communism around the Pacific where he repeatedly asked whether 
Canada was interested in a “Pacific Pact” similar to the then pending NATO treaty, or at least a 
stronger defence relationship with New Zealand and Australia.   
There are communist armies swarming over China; a greatly increased communist 
vote in Japan; communist uprisings in Malaya and in Burma, and a communist 
problem in India.  In fact in that part of the world it looks as though the soviet 
[sic] is winning by default…  It may be that while we are bolting the front door by 
the North Atlantic treaty we are leaving the back door open by doing nothing in 
the Pacific.
108
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Collective security seemed a safe response. In March 1950, after the communist takeover in 
China and the American announcement to develop the hydrogen bomb, he asked that Canada 
“take the lead in bringing the nations of the Pacific together” against the emerging threat of 
guided missiles in submarines and remarked that “just as surely as night follows day… in the 
event of a third world war Canada will be in the position of Belgium in the first one.”
109
  When 
Lester Pearson doubted that conditions in the Pacific required the same concern as in the 
Atlantic, Green countered: “But they may be wrong.”
110
  Green continued to advocate increased 
Canadian participation in the Pacific well into the 1950s.
111
 Far from the patient negotiator he 
would become a decade later, he continued to believe that Communism was something to be 
contained and even combated rather than a force with which to negotiate in good faith.
112
  These 
comments were not the result of fear mongering; in his letters he remained wary of excessive 
opposition to communism.
113
  Green’s comments were inspired by fear, not politics, and he 
believed his position was balanced. 
War on the Korean peninsula in late June 1950 confirmed Green’s fears.  His immediate 
concerns were alarmist, emotional, and he again pushed for Canadian involvement in the war.  
He asked in the House if events in Korea had changed the government’s position on a “Pacific 
defence council”?  Was Canada in a position to defend itself against airborne attacks mounted 
from the air or sea?
114
 Lastly, as Denis Stairs points out, Green “was particularly prominent” in 
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pushing for Canada’s forces to be included in a Commonwealth Division.
115
  He legitimized this 
desire based on his First World War experience when Canadian forces so often fought beside 
British, Australian, New Zealand and other (now) Commonwealth forces. When Pearson rejected 
this appeal by emphasizing Canada’s commitment to United Nations rather than Commonwealth 
units, Green dismissed the argument as “pussyfooting.”
116
  Though the Canadian Brigade would 
later be deployed in a Commonwealth Division, this was for reasons of supply and equipment 
rather than due to any emotional or historic bond.
117
  Green was keenly interested in events but 
lacked insight regarding their complexities. 
Green’s alarm escalated.  Struck by China’s entry into the war in late 1950, he became 
convinced that the spread of communism had to be stopped at all costs: “There must be less 
emphasis put on trying to keep from offending the communists and far more put on victory.”
118
  
Claiming that Canada “has not done her share to date” he demanded that Canada send all three 
battalions of the 25
th
 Canadian Infantry Brigade to Korea.
119
  The reputation of the United 
Nations and thus possibly its very existence relied on the United Nations forces achieving all of 
its goals, and Green believed Canada was duty bound to assist these ends.  Green went on to 
propose actions that would have likely escalated the conflict such as blockading China as well as 
bombing airbases on its territory near the Korean border.  He even advocated the use of Chinese 
Nationalist troops in Korea (which might have also sparked a wider conflict).
120
  Indeed Brooke 
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Claxton commented that Green’s suggestions “would increase the risks of a general war, without 
increasing the opportunity for bringing about a successful termination of hostilities in Korea 
upon terms which would be acceptable to those nations” and went on to doubt that Green’s party 
backed him.
121
  Indeed it seems that Green was muzzled after this speech: aside from a brief jab 
asking whether Canadian policy “means asking Canadian troops in Korea with hand to fight in 
Korea with one hand tied behind their backs,” he made no further comments in the House of 
Commons.
122
  Howard Green was still no peacemonger.  As in the Second World War he had no 
love for war, but he nevertheless continued to encourage rather than discourage Canadian 
military involvement and expressed frustration when he believed Canada was shirking its 
responsibilities. 
 
* * * 
 
Despite his knowledge regarding nuclear arms, there is no record of Green discussing 
other nuclear developments in any depth.  For instance, in 1954, NATO governments admitted 
that it was impossible to achieve parity with the Soviet Union’s conventional forces and 
therefore agreed in principle to develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons as a “force 
equalizer.”  Green never commented on this decision, either positively or negatively, while in 
Opposition.  Though he did periodically mention other weapons developments such as the 
American decision to produce the Hydrogen bomb and its subsequent testing, these remarks were 
superficial.  Moreover, Green continued to believe that nuclear war was survivable.  In one case 
he advised that Canada disperse its industry so that it could continue to fight after suffering a 
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 Aside from commonplace mention of disarmament negotiations, Green did not 
discuss the subject in the House of Commons.
124
  Again awareness did not translate to 





* * * 
 
Lest readers gain the impression that Green was a warmonger, Green’s involvement in 
the creation and running of the Department of Defence Production demonstrates that he was not 
a fearmonger; he believed that preparation for conflict had to reflect external threats.  With the 
Korean War in full swing and international tensions on the rise, the Canadian government 
embarked on a massive rearmament program.  Defence expenditures quickly became the largest 
portion of federal spending and the Canadian government sought a department to coordinate and 
supervise defence production.
126
  A mandate of this size required “wide powers” and the 
Progressive Conservative Party did not oppose the department’s creation.  Speaking for the 
party, however, Howard Green opposed the extent of these powers.
127
  In the initial debate Green 
sought to limit the department’s powers to what he believed world tensions warranted:   
…this bill interferes drastically with the rights of the individual Canadian, and 
also overrides parliament to a degree which we believe unnecessary and unwise at 
this time – in fact, to a degree which is justifiable only when the nation is in the 
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midst of a war; and even under those conditions the wisdom of using some of 
those powers is very questionable.
128
 
He went to describe the Act as a “war bill” and pointed out that: “the country is not in a third 
world war.”
129
 The legislation empowered the government to force an individual to accept a 
contract, and to take over the business if cooperation was not forthcoming.  The bill’s failure to 
ask the department to file an annual report was also a cause for concern.  Green asked on behalf 
of his party that these and a few other powers be removed from the bill. His efforts achieved 
little.
130
   
When the government sought to make the Department of Defence Production a 
permanent entity, Green again agreed that the Department was necessary, but continued to object 
to its encompassing powers.  Though he recognized that the invention of Hydrogen bombs, 
supersonic planes and guided missiles were changing the nature of any future war, he continued 
to doubt that the international situation justified such powers.
131
  Then, as Green so aptly 
described a previous encounter with C.D . Howe (the department’s Minister) in the Commons: 
“the fur began to fly.”
132
  He accused Howe of coveting his power; Howe accused Green of 
being “the king of exaggeration.”
133
  According to Robert Bothwell: “It became a popular indoor 
sport to listen to Green’s nasal tones sapping Howe’s patience and undermining his defences.”
134
  
In the end Howe got his department and Green ironically became Acting Minister of Defence 
Production in 1957.   
Howard Green only pushed for increased military readiness or participation when he 
considered it justified; he was not a warmonger who used every excuse to empower the military.  
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Moreover, it is worth noting that by the mid-1950s he believed that the international situation 
was under control and therefore fought against expanding the government’s powers.  This 
moderation was not the result of fearing war, but rather the result of an increased faith in 
deterrence.  Green was not yet exhibiting the traits of Erika Simpson’s Critics. 
 
* * * 
 
The Suez crisis of 1956 provided Green with what became the ultimate clash of his two 
sets of values regarding the Commonwealth.  Briefly, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 after the United States refused to guarantee a loan from the 
World Bank to finance Egypt’s Aswan Damn project.  Britain and France approached Israel 
which promised to attack Egypt and jeopardize safe passage in the canal.  Britain and France 
would then issue an ultimatum asking both sides to cease operations and, when Egypt failed to 
heed this warning, the two countries would seize the canal, ostensibly as a disinterested party.  
Most countries, including Canada and the United States, were not informed of this machination, 
and when both the US and USSR objected to the actions of Britain and France, fears abounded 
that the conflict would spread.  Canada’s minister for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, 
intervened during an Emergency Session of the UNGA and secured the creation of the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that eventually divided the forces of Egypt and Israel and 




                                                
135
 Edward Michael Pompa, “Canadian Foreign Policy During the Suez Crisis of 1956”, PhD diss. St. John’s 
University (New York), 1970, Chapter 1; Canada, 1945-Present, 143-145. 
67 
During the crisis Green provided outspoken support for Great Britain, France and Israel 
and condemned many of Canada’s actions.  Indeed, John English describes Green as “the most 
vociferous Conservative critic.”
136
  At the height of the debate Green famously proclaimed that 
the Liberal government’s actions: 
made this month of November, 1956, the most disgraceful period for Canada in 
the history of this nation…  it is high time that Canada had leadership more in line 
with the forthrightness and the courage of the Canadian people.  It is high time 
Canada had a government which will not knife Canada’s best friends [the UK and 
France] in the back.
137
 
This angry denunciation marked the final blow in a fiery speech that he began the previous day.  
At first glance these comments, as well as his subsequent remarks, appear to criticize almost 
every action taken by the government at the UNGA.  However, in subsequent interviews, Green 
commented that his angst was not raised by Pearson’s actions so much as the way they were 
carried out, and most importantly the way they had been presented by the Prime Minister on 
November 26 in the House of Commons. Green had long thought that prime minister St. Laurent 
harboured “bitterness against anything British.”
138
 St. Laurent’s defensive speech attempted to 
defuse many of the allegations against his government by the Acting Leader of the Conservative 
Party Earle Rowe (Dufferin-Simcoe).  Most infamously, after describing how France and the UK 
had abused their vetoes in the Security Council by using them to paralyze the body while 
continuing their plans, the Prime Minister commented that “the era when the supermen of 
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Europe could govern the whole world has and is coming pretty close to an end.”
139
 St. Laurent’s 
anger was the result of Britain’s choice to lie to Canada about its conduct.
140
  However Green did 
not know this and perceived St. Laurent’s comments as anti-British and unjustified. 
Thus, a large portion of Green’s speech concerned St. Laurent’s comments.  “The feature 
of the speech the Prime Minister delivered today, Mr. Speaker, was the anger, almost the hatred 
he showed in his remarks,” Green observed.
141
   He frequently referred to the Prime Minister’s 
“supermen” comment and other “slurring remarks.”
142
  When St. Laurent interrupted Green to 
argue with some of these points Green rebuked him: “The Prime Minister once again is 
attempting to prevent free discussion in the house.”
143
  On the whole Green’s speech is best 
described as a rant, providing more rhetoric than reason.  For instance, though he was careful to 
never say so, Green implied that Canada should have voted against the American sponsored 
Resolution 997 that requested a ceasefire because its intentionally neutral language did not judge 
either side when asking that hostilities cease.  In Green’s view, this neutrality devalued Britain’s 
actions and was therefore intolerable even though the resolution was designed to create peace.  
Moreover, if Canada had voted as Green had wished, it would have jeopardized Canada’s 
subsequent intervention.
144
  Green’s famous comments were premeditated, he was not speaking 
off the cuff; his illogical message remained the result of emotions rather than his intellect.
145
 
Even in this thick rhetoric, other themes existed.  Though submerged beneath a thick coat 
of anglophile rhetoric Green’s reasoning was more complex (albeit barely) than that of “a 
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colonial chore boy running around shouting, ‘Ready, aye, ready’” as Pearson alleged.
146
  First, 
Green complained repeatedly that Canada had followed the United States at the expense of 
Britain.  He believed that the Americans had caused the crisis by withdrawing their funding from 
the Aswan dam project in an attempt “to get the United Kingdom and France out of the Middle 
East” and that by not opposing the United States “Canada’s policy seems to be the same.”  As he 
perceived Canada’s interests to be similar to Britain’s, he considered this choice unreasonable.  
Far from an independent actor, Canada had become a “chore boy” of the United States.
147
  
Second, Green believed Nasser was susceptible to communist influences and that Canada’s 
efforts to prevent the retaking of the canal were unwise.
148
  Again, in Green’s mind, Canada 
should have treated the intervention of France and Great Britain more sympathetically because it 
was in Canada’s interest to do so.  More generally, as political commentator Maxwell Cohen 
observed, “the plain truth is that Mr. Green probably had no real opportunities in a busy 
Parliamentary life to formulate a philosophy of Canada in the world other than the working, 
inarticulate assumptions shared by many within his party and outside.”
149
 
On the whole, it is fortunate that Lester Pearson rather than Howard Green was SSEA in 
1956.  It is doubtful that Canadian support of Britain during the Suez crisis would have improved 
Britain’s position; indeed, it is likely that Britain would have fared worse as few other statesmen 
could have filled Pearson’s shoes.  To a considerable extent Green was blinded by an emotional 
attachment to Britain.  However his rage was provoked to a considerable extent by the rhetoric of 
the Prime Minister rather than by the actions of Lester Pearson. Some claim that Green and 
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others like him should have seen through the British-French-Israeli plot.
150
 Others, such as Bruce 
Hutchinson, are more sympathetic: though Green “misunderstood” the crisis he was “ignorant of 
the contrary facts” that might have led to him to be more reserved.
151
   Patricia McMahon 
ventures so far as to claim that: “more Canadians rejected the government’s position than 
supported it.”
152
  Indeed Green received 64% of the vote in his riding in 1957 (he received 44% 
in 1953) and, though it is difficult to determine how much of the vote to attribute to his 
performance in the Suez debates, the Pipeline debates, Diefenbaker’s campaigning, or the 
general unpopularity of the Liberals, Green believed his performance in the Suez debates 




* * * 
 
On the eve of the fall of St. Laurent’s Liberals in 1957, Howard Green was still far from 
his disarmament future.  Over the previous two decades he had risen to become a leading Tory in 
the House of Commons, famous for his wit and love of debate.  Throughout the Second World 
War he fought for a total war effort.  Similarly in the Korean War, Green issued requests so 
radical that his own party seems to have taken the rare measure of muzzling him.  In the Suez 
debates Green fought with equal passion for Canada’s mother countries, though in this case his 
stance was in part provoked by Liberals expressing frustration about their contemporaries across 
the Atlantic.  On the other hand, he attended an increasing number of meetings of the Standing 
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Committee on External Affairs and acquired knowledge on the varied aspects of external affairs.  
Throughout this period he had also pushed for and received more information about atomic 
energy.  In short, well before June 1959 all of the pieces required to make Green a disarmament 
advocate were in place, but he consistently acted otherwise.  Both during the Korean War and 
after the Suez crisis Green continued to ask that Canada take actions more provocative than its 
Liberal leaders preferred.  It was not that Green itched for war; on the contrary he dreaded war 
like any public leader should; rather he continued to view it as a necessary part of foreign policy. 
 
72 
Chapter 3: UN Resolutions 
 
 In election June 1957, the Progressive Conservative party led by John Diefenbaker won a 
minority government. Howard Green was named Minister of Public Works.  He excelled in this 
role for two years, and, except for being too strict about ending patronage within the department, 
he was widely praised for his service.
1
  On numerous occasions he served as Acting Prime 
Minister in Diefenbaker’s absence.  In March 1959, the death of Canada’s Secretary of State for 
External Affairs Sidney Smith created a new job opening.  After careful deliberation, 
Diefenbaker selected Green as his next SSEA, and was appointed to his new post on June 4, 
1959. 
 The choice shocked many.  Green had favourable traits: he was known for his integrity 
and ability to engage in seemingly endless detailed debates in the House of Commons.  
However, many political commentators believed he was ill- matched for his new portfolio 
because he lacked the necessary experience in foreign affairs to succeed at his new post.  For 
example, in a department known at the time for its diplomatic functions and generous alcohol 
consumption, Green was a teetotaller.  Aside from a brief trip to the United States, Green had not 
been overseas since the First World War.  Unlike Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson, or Paul 
Martin, he had not served in any Canadian foreign delegations.  Moreover, though his activities 
in external affairs debates and committees were known, only a few years had passed since Green 
had blasted Lester Pearson (then SSEA) for not supporting Britain and France during the Suez 
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Crisis.  This exchange continued to dominate his critic’s memories.
2
  Even Green admitted that, 
at 63 years of age, he had much to learn about his new department.
3
 
 Many believed that Green’s inexperience would render him impressionable.
4
  Some 
feared that Diefenbaker, who had twice held the External Affairs portfolio in 1957 and 1959, 
appointed his close friend Green so that he could retain tight control of the department.  The 
Liberal Toronto Daily Star went so far as to suggest that:  
Mr. Green’s very innocence of foreign affairs is unlikely to dispose him to argue 
much with his boss.  This is a one-man government and you can’t have a strong 
minister at external affairs if the P.M., who must have a big say anyway, is 
determined to run all foreign policy himself.
5
   
How mistaken they were.  Similarly, several academics commented in the course of conversation 
with this author that Howard Green might have fallen prey to the intellectual prowess of his 
Under-Secretary Norman Robertson, who had long sympathized with disarmament.  This would 
certainly explain Green’s relatively sudden conversion to disarmament crusader.  Indeed, only 
days before Green’s appointment Robertson forwarded an editorial to Diefenbaker advocating 
unilateral nuclear disarmament (directly opposing the Western position that required “balanced 
concessions”) and a focus on conventional arms. – Robertson’s cover letter explained that his 
views “coincide with those of the author.”
6
  In the course of researching this thesis, however, 
every credible academic source argued against such influence.
7
   J.L. Granatstein emphasizes a 
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partnership between Green and Robertson wherein the latter’s role was to “supply Green with 
arguments.”
8
  An internal American brief described the Under-Secretary as “the ‘Grey 
Eminence’ behind Diefenbaker and Green.”
9
  Robertson certainly made Green more effective, 
but that was his job. Green appreciated Robertson’s empathy, but required little encouragement 
when pursuing independent policies.  Moreover, Green did not always accept his Under-
Secretary’s advice and sometimes pushed beyond Robertson’s advice (generally with negative 
results).  Green was not manipulated. 
 Given his longstanding Protestantism and his propensity to refuse to work on Sundays, 
some may assume that Green’s disarmament crusade was, at least partially the result of religious 
conviction.  The authors of Canada Since 1945 state that: “Rereading the arguments twenty 
years later, one detects the last gasps of the Protestant conscience in an incompletely secularized 
disguise.”
10
  George Pearkes also described Green’s convictions as having an “evangelical” 
route, although his evidence stems more from Green’s style than his motivation.
11
  More 
generally, religion was often used to buttress Critic arguments and clerics were often avid 
supporters of disarmament.  However membership in the most prominent of these organizations 
often spanned beyond religious and even ideological lines.
12
  Though Green’s stand was 
frequently moralistic, he almost never linked his disarmament convictions with religion.  The 
only notable exception occurred when Green concluded a speech to a joint meeting of the 
Empire and Canadian Clubs in 1959: 
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Add Canada’s good record generally, her growing economic strength and the 
courage, common sense and God-fearing character of her people and you will 
agree with me that we can give leadership in the finest sense of the word.
13
 
Again this comment is an exception to Green’s otherwise secular justification for his 
disarmament initiative.  Though the two sets of values were in many cases complimentary, one 
of Green’s sons continues to contend that humanitarian rather than religious concerns inspired 
his father’s fight for disarmament.
14
 
 A remaining explanation is that Green’s second wife Donna Kerr, as a former “scientist 
with a lively and informed concern for the human condition,” educated Green about the effects 
of atomic radiation.
15
  (Green’s first wife passed in 1953 from stomach cancer.
16
)  In 1956 
Howard Green married Donna, a long-time friend of the family who had excelled in her work 
and retired as Assistant Director of the Provincial Public Health Laboratories in Vancouver and a 
lecturer in Bacteriology  across B.C.
17
  While Donna may have provided Green with insights into 
the hazards of atomic warfare, Green already possessed more than adequate background from his 
committee work in the House of Commons.  Moreover, my research failed to uncover evidence 
corroborating any assistance from Donna on Howard’s decision-making. 
Instead, Green developed his strong beliefs about disarmament independently.  In notes 
summarizing an interview with Green, John Hilliker best summarized Green’s conversion as 
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“[Green’s] own response to events.”
18
  The future SSEA did not make the switch to peacemonger 
until shortly after his appointment.  Green himself later commented: 
Quite early in the game, it became very apparent to me that the main problem for 
Canada was the danger of nuclear war.   Before that, if you remember, there had 
been a lot of nuclear tests, and they were big tests, and both the Americans and 
the Russians were conducting them.  Canada happens to be in one of the worst 
fallout zones of the world… And if there is a nuclear war, Canada probably would 
be the main battleground.  I think that would be the end of Canada.  This is where 
we had to put our stress.  So that was what we did.
19
 
Green had been aware of the destructive power of atomic weapons for the previous decade but he 
was not familiar with Canada’s geographical vulnerability to radioactive fallout.  Sometime in 
June or July 1959, however, Green learned that radiation fallout from atomic tests or nuclear war 
fell disproportionately in temperate zones, where most Canadians live (in the Northern 
Hemisphere roughly 30ºN and 60ºN).
20
   
Scientists had previously assumed that radioactive particles would disperse across the 
entire planet (rather than remaining relatively latitudinally stationary) and thereby diffuse the 
fallout.  During McNaughton’s testimony in 1947 before the Standing Committee on External 
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Affairs, Green had been briefed on this effect and though McNaughton said that these particles 
could remain in the air “for weeks and they drift with the wind currents for thousands of miles” 
he added that during their transport “they were so thoroughly dissipated that they were 
harmless.”
21
  Therefore, Green’s considerable knowledge of atomic weaponry did not warn him 
about this threat, though it did provide him with the ability to understand its potential once the 
earth’s true fallout patterns were better understood. 
Two sources likely created this awareness.  First, after his appointment Green read a 
multitude of memoranda and it is likely that he learned about fallout during this education.
22
  
Second, Hilliker claims that Green only developed a strong concern for fallout after witnessing 
its discussion at the 14
th
 session of the UNGA.
23
  Regardless, Green concluded that: 
No one escapes in any part of the world… The whole world will be suffering, and 
no part of the commonwealth will be suffering more than Canada, because here 
we are between the two main contenders… Further, we are in a temperate zone 
where fall-out is far more serious than it is in other zones of the world.  Canada is 
the nation in the commonwealth which will have the most to lose if there should 
be a nuclear war.
24
 
Green’s updated understanding, combined with his previous knowledge and newfound ability to 
act on his convictions, led to his conversion to a peacemonger.  War no longer seemed 
survivable.  On June 4, 1959, Diefenbaker did not know that he was appointing a man who 
would interrupt and later attempt to overturn the government’s established trajectory towards 
acquiring nuclear weapons.  Green likely shared in this ignorance. 
 
* * * 
                                                
21
 Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs: No. 9, 5 June 1947, 246. 
22
 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 8 July 1959, 5708. 
23
 Hilliker and Barry. Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Volume 2 Coming of Age, 151-152.  When 
discussing Green’s interest in fallout, Hilliker and Barry do not refer to Canada’s temperate zone location, but 
rather to its position between the two superpowers and the inevitable fallout that Canada would suffer during an 
atomic conflict. 
24
 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 14 February 1960, 141. 
78 
 By June 1959 two important forces were shaping Canada’s atomic policies on the world 
stage.  First the Diefenbaker government was well on its way to acquiring nuclear weapons.  
Briefly, in 1957, the newly elected prime minister had joined his NATO colleagues in 
reaffirming the planned deployment of tactical nuclear weapons as “force equalizers.”
25
   The 
government’s acceptance of the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD) was also an 
implicit agreement to homogenize Canada’s air defences with their US counterparts by adding 
nuclear weapons.
26
  In September 1958 the Diefenbaker government announced its intention to 
acquire the BOMARC surface-to-air missile of the defence of North America that it claimed 
could “be used with either a conventional high explosive warhead or a nuclear warhead.”
27
  Five 
months later, while announcing the termination of the Avro Arrow program, Diefenbaker 
specified his commitment to nuclear warheads for the BOMARC and other weapons vehicles 
destined for deployment on both Canadian and European soil: 
 The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they 
are armed with nuclear warheads… We are confident that we shall be able to 
reach a formal agreement with the United States on appropriate means to serve 
the common objective… [Moreover, to prevent the expansion of the nuclear club] 
we consider that it is expedient that ownership and custody of the nuclear 
warheads should remain with the United States.
28
 
Though no agreement was yet signed, the Diefenbaker government had committed itself to 
equipping its military with nuclear warheads.  Moreover, there was also a long and progressive 
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history of the United States deploying nuclear weapons in aircraft over Canadian territory.
29
  By 
1959, negotiations were underway by the United States Air Force (USAF) to store the MB-1 
defensive air-to-air tactical nuclear rockets at American bases on Canadian territory.  Patricia 
McMahon points out that as Acting Minister of Defence Production Green should have been 
aware of these developments and one numerous occasions failed to mount any opposition.
30
  
Green later claimed that the repercussions of these decisions were not fully understood by the 
cabinet at the time, and while this is possible (though scary), the most important note is that 
Green felt no need to investigate the matter further.
31
 
 The second force in the international arena was disarmament.
32
  With few exceptions, 
progress during the past decade had been disappointing though the two sides had at least moved 
from their more diametrical positions and the remaining disagreements were more fully 
understood.
33
  There had been no body for continued negotiations on disarmament since 1957 
when the Soviet Union left the Disarmament Sub-Committee meetings in London citing the fact 
that it was alone against four Western countries.  Eventually the great powers created the Ten 
Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC), which was composed of five Western countries 
(including Canada) and five Soviet countries.  Many hoped that this new body would facilitate 
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fruitful discussion.  “World hope for general and complete disarmament was never more 
prevalent than during 1959 and 1960.”
34
  With these two strong and (as Green came to believe) 
opposing forces in play, Howard Green entered the fray. 
 Howard Green, George Ignatieff, Norman Robertson, and many others believed that their 
cause was both important and carried some possibility of progress.  This possibility was worth 
pursuing because failure to negotiate could have heightened tensions.  Though Canada had 
clearly committed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, many at DEA continued to believe 
otherwise or at least hoped that this aim could be changed.  It is only by examining the actions 
and motivations of Critics within the narrative of Canada’s acquisition narrative that Canada’s 
nuclear arms crisis can be fully understood.  Paralleling the acquisition and disarmament 
narratives demonstrates that though the government’s decision remained simple in principle (i.e. 
whether to acquire or not acquire nuclear warheads), its underlying complexity made it 
vulnerable to opposition. 
Green’s antagonism was not immediate, contrary to the impression provided by some 
authors.
35
  Careful examination of the archival record proves that Green did not move against 
nuclear weapons from the outset; instead his tenacity developed over a much longer period of 
time.  Moreover, Canada’s SSEA recognized that outright opposition to nuclear warheads was 
unlikely to succeed, so his department facilitated delay after delay so that the indecisive 
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* * * 
 
 Some writers on the nuclear arms question move from Green’s appointment in June 1959 
to his opposition to Operation SKYHAWK from late August to September.
37
  These authors 
create the false impression that Green opposed American defence plans from the outset.   Patricia 
McMahon astutely observes that key decisions as well as negotiations regarding nuclear weapons 
continued between June and late August of 1959.
38
  During this period, Green’s apparent 
indifference to Canada’s atomic trajectory continued. 
 Throughout this early period, the Diefenbaker cabinet considered a variety of roles that 
required nuclear warheads.  The most dominant concern was the conversion of Canada’s F-86 





cabinet discussed this new role.  Even though Pearkes explicitly explained that the role required 
the use of nuclear weapons, Green voiced no significant opposition.
39
  In July and August, Green 
watched the government commit itself to the CF-104 aircraft and begin the tendering process 
without expressing any opposition.
40
  Thus, at this stage Green did not exhibit Critic beliefs.  As 
already mentioned, McMahon continues to attribute Green’s relative silence to “a lack of 
knowledge” despite previously stating that should have been aware of Canada’s trajectory during 
his work at the Department of Defence Production.
41
  Alternatively, his silence may have 
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resulted from understanding the consequences of the government’s path.  A seasoned politician, 
Green must have known that opposing a cabinet decision of atomic magnitude alone was futile.  
Only with confidence and a proven track record could he have any hope of changing the 
government’s direction.  Moreover Green’s previous knowledge of atomic weaponry meant that 
he was one of the more informed members of the cabinet and by no means naïve.  The most 
likely explanation is therefore that Green lacked confidence in either himself, or the legitimacy 
of his concerns and therefore failed to act at this early stage. 
On August 11, 1959, the Canadian government discovered joint plans with the US for an 
air-defence exercise, Operation SKYHAWK, that included the use of Canadian territory.  
Though the Americans had been planning the exercise with Canadian NORAD officials since 
January of that year, the operations initially proposed were routine.  On July 29
th
 the decision 
was made to ground all aircraft in North America for a six-hour period so that a large-scale 
radar-jamming test could be conducted.  By this point the Americans had spent millions of 
dollars preparing for the exercise and had assumed Ottawa would agree that this additional 
measure was necessary.  The Department of External Affairs, however, considered the grounding 
of Canadian civil airliners “ill-advised” and provocative in light of Khrushchev’s recent visit to 
the United States.  Green agreed with this interpretation and the Cabinet’s dissent for the entire 
exercise was garnered on August 26.  According to subsequent diplomatic reports American 
officials were “mad as hell.”
42
  Three days later, the American Ambassador met with 
Diefenbaker to request Canada’s reconsideration of the exercise.  Despite assurances from the 
Ambassador that the Americans had delayed the planned exercise from August to October to 
allay any possible Soviet concerns, Diefenbaker stood firm.  The Prime Minister believed that 
the exercise would heighten international tensions, and the lack of political consultation 
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demonstrated an alleged unwillingness of military officials to consult with their civilian masters.  
Shortly thereafter, the Americans cancelled the exercise.
43
  
Green’s specific actions on a day-to-day basis remain unclear.  Some have attributed 
Canada’s rejection to Diefenbaker and minimized Green’s influence.
44
  However, Knowlton 
Nash attributes the inspiration for Canada’s opposition to Green.  More generally, J.L. 
Granatstein writes:  
this was Green’s first victory in Cabinet as Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
the first time he had managed to translate his concerns about war and the United 




Green had successfully opposed a military exercise that he believed would heighten world 
tensions.  However, he required further impetus before he was willing to take more active 
measures against nuclear weapons. 
 
* * * 
 
 Green’s first visit to the United Nations (UN) in the fall of 1959 provided him with the 
“inspiration” he required to more actively combat the arms race.  The previous UNGA meeting 
had failed to produce any progress in disarmament.  One briefing summarized the previous 
year’s congregation as “disagreeable, disturbing, and unproductive” as the session had devolved 
into power bloc voting.
46
  Neither the Soviets nor the West had managed to gain the support of 
the non-committed members as neither side demonstrated credible leadership. From the outset, 
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Green was determined (as were many others) to use the United Nations as a vehicle for Canada 
to make progress towards international agreement in a bi-polar world. 
At the 14
th
 session, Green planned to focus on select topics on which he and his 
department believed progress was possible.  Chief among these was his concern about atomic 
radiation.  In his maiden speech to the United Nations on September 24, Green proposed that the 
world conduct more research regarding the hazards of radiation.  Standardization and greater 
coverage in sampling were both required for the world to fill knowledge “gaps” regarding the 
effects of radiation from both natural and human (nuclear detonations) sources.  Though the 
initiative was admittedly meek in scale, Green’s selection of this subject to initiate his work at 
the UN emphasizes his concern regarding fallout.
47
 
 Contrary to his former opposition to negotiating with Communists, Green’s speech 
introducing the draft resolution offered several olive branches to the Soviet Union.  Green 
praised recent Soviet achievements in space and acknowledged the Soviet desire for real arms 
reductions.  It should be recalled that in past disarmament negotiations, the Soviet Union had 
long emphasized arms reduction at the expense of credible verification while the West had 
emphasized the need to verify disarmament at the expense of arms reduction.
48
  Though Green 
never left the West’s position, he recognized the veracity of Soviet concerns: “Without control, 
the mutual confidence required to disarm would be lacking… Without disarmament control of 
course would be irrelevant.”
49
  In Renegade in Power, Peter Newman implies that Green did not 
understand the content of his own speech.  As evidence he cites an example where a reporter 
asked Green to explain the predicate of this statement without quoting the former.  After a 
                                                
47
 Howard Green, “Canada’s Views on World Problems”, 24 September 1959, Statements and Speeches 59/30, 5. 
48
 Epstein, Disarmament: Twenty-five Years of Effort, 12. 
49
 Howard Green, “Canada’s Views on World Problems”, 24 September 1959, Statements and Speeches 59/30, 1-2, 
4. 
85 
prolonged response, Green replied: “Oh, I thought it was just put in there to round out the 
sentence.”
50
  Green’s response was motivated by far more complex motives than ineptitude.  
When reporters focused on Green’s comment acknowledging the Soviet perspective, Green had 
three choices: 1) repeat the Western perspective, 2) defend his statement with a lengthy and 
complex defence sure to bore his audience, 3) deflect the question.  The first two options would 
have damaged the potency of Green’s non-partisan appeal, and he therefore chose his only 
remaining option: telling a joke at his own expense (thereby taking neither side). Though some 
continued to refer to the section of his speech as a “weakness,” other reporters found no fault 
with Green’s answer.
51
 His comment demonstrated astuteness rather than ineptitude.  More 
generally, the Canadian proposal was front-page news in The Globe and Mail and was therefore 
important to Canadians.
52
 Green’s confidence was growing. 
 The press continued to follow the progress of Green’s initiative as it neared a vote.
53
  
Eventually Argentina, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New 
Zealand, and Norway sponsored the resolution.  On November 17
th
, the UNGA unanimously 
passed the Canadian initiative as Resolution 1376 with 78 states in favour, none opposed or 
abstaining, and 4 absent.
54
  The news received headline attention on the front pages of both The 
Globe and Mail and the Vancouver Province.
55
  Despite its limited scope, the global consensus 
on a subject that deeply concerned Green must have been moving.  He had both discovered and 
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demonstrated that global consensus on limited but important aspects of disarmament was 
possible.  He was now proud to have “an accomplishment” at the UN.
56
 
 During the session, Green also supported the disarmament initiatives of other states with 
increasing conviction.
57
  Perhaps most controversially, Canada voted for a Moroccan resolution 
asking France to “refrain” from conducting any atomic tests.
58
  France’s independent nuclear 
bomb project had been known for some time.  In 1958, the US, USSR and UK had all agreed to a 
voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests and France’s plans to detonate their first atomic device in 
early 1960 threatened to destabilize this agreement.
59
  World opinion was therefore generally 
against France’s plans and the Moroccan resolution voiced this discontent.  However, Canada 
was a strong proponent of NATO, and France’s choice to pursue an independent nuclear path 
spurred from dissatisfaction with the alliance.  Western unity was therefore crucial.  If Canada 
voted against France, it would do so outside of the Alliance’s position.  Green advocated and 
secured Cabinet’s permission to do so, and when Canada announced its plans the French 
Ambassador requested an immediate meeting with Canada’s Prime Minister entreating him to 
reassess Canada’s position.  The ambassador was particularly concerned because “Canada had a 
great deal of influence in the Assembly and quite a large number of Delegations would follow 
the Canadian lead.”
60
  Though Diefenbaker refused to reconsider at the meeting, he later met 
with some of his ministers who considered Green’s plans harsh.  David Fulton was asked to 
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contact Green to discuss the situation.  However, “Green was canny enough to not be reachable, 
and thus Canada came out against the French bomb tests as Green had been determined to do all 
along.”
61
  Most of Canada’s allies, including the US and UK, abstained.  Though the resolution 
was futile, Canada’s symbolic stance against the expansion of the “nuclear club”
62
 was critical in 
Green’s mind. 
Again, Canada’s vote was front-page news in Canada.
63
  During the 14
th
 session of the 
UNGA, Canada’s SSEA discovered that he was not alone in his convictions.  Canada’s radiation 
resolution demonstrated that countries from around the world desired greater international 
stability and could agree despite their differing allegiances.  Thus the UNGA’s 14
th
 session 
produced optimism for the future and while it is easy to dismiss Canada’s limited success in the 
shadow of more pressing concerns like France’s planned nuclear tests it is doubtful that Canada’s 
resolution would have been possible five years earlier.
64
  Basil Robinson aptly concludes that: 
“The government had a tough and influential peacemonger as its external affairs minister, and he 
was just at the dawn of his new incarnation.”
65
  Green had established a platform against nuclear 
weapons for Canada at the UN; maintaining this policy at home in light of Canada’s defence 
commitments would prove more difficult. 
 
* * * 
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Canada’s government continued to struggle with the question of whether to allow nuclear 
weapons onto its soil.  Beginning in August 1959, Howard Green wanted more control over any 
warheads stored on Canadian soil.  On September 22 the cabinet approved a draft note for 
American consideration regarding the possibility of deploying MB-1s at American bases.
66
  The 
Americans replied with their own revisions on January 14, 1960.  The exchange of these drafts 
emphasized the remaining problem of “custody” (the right to manage access and conditions for 
the nuclear warheads while in storage) and “control” (the right to deploy weapons systems once 
armed with nuclear warheads).  Green claimed that Canadian sovereignty could only be 
protected if custody and control of nuclear weapons on Canadian bases was “joint.”  He feared 
what Erika Simpson dubs “entrapment” -- the concern that Canada’s alliance system would drag 
it into a war it did not want to fight.
67
  Undoubtedly, if an all-out attack occurred, Green and his 
department fervently believed that Canada needed to fulfil its commitments.  However, Green 
(and Diefenbaker) distrusted the American military.
68
  Under US law, ownership of warheads 
had to remain solely American and the Americans also demanded that custody remain their sole 
domain.  The US argued that these measures were necessary to prevent the expansion of the 
nuclear club.  While Green recognized the legitimacy of American concerns he continued to 
argue that Canadian sovereignty could only be adequately protected via joint custody.
69
  Pearson 
also shared these concerns for several years.
70
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Initially Green heeded DEA’s repeated advice against insisting on joint custody, as its 
officials believed the existing control arrangements were sufficient.
71
  In Cabinet on September 
11, 1959, he explained that: “his advisors… were reluctant to recommend that Canada should 
insist on joint responsibility for the physical security of these nuclear weapons on leased bases” 
and went on to support his department’s conviction by explaining that the US “would have good 
legal grounds for not agreeing to the request.”
72
  His subsequent choice to resume demands for 
joint custody demonstrated a new and powerful tactic to deter Canada’s nuclear trajectory: 
exploitation of Diefenbaker’s sovereigntist sympathies as well as his indecisive nature.   
Moreover, George Pearkes later agreed the Diefenbaker was “emotionally on Green’ side.”
73
  
Given that Canada had already agreed in principle to the provisioning of American interceptors 
based at Goose Bay and Harmon Field with the MB-1, Green had little chance of reversing the 
decision.
74
  All knew the principles established in this agreement would be used in subsequent 
negotiations regarding warheads for the Canadian military.  Green therefore prolonged the 




Green continued to utilize this argument against the deployment of MB-1s on American 
interceptors through to the end of 1960.  By March of 1960 the Americans had examined the 
Canadian proposal and rejected Green’s demand for joint custody.  Remaining insistent in 
principle, but willing to compromise in form, Canada added a section to the draft agreement 
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providing some degree of joint custody: “Canada will provide a representative or representatives 
at each base.”
76
 Thus, by the opening months of 1960, Diefenbaker retreated from his statement 
of February 20, 1959 that ascribed both control and custody of nuclear warheads as a sole 
American responsibility.
77
  The Prime Minister now embraced Green’s argument that “joint 
control” was necessary for any warheads based on Canadian soil for American aircraft. 
Diefenbaker also embraced the more general argument that Canada had a right to joint 
control of any warheads deployed by the Canadian military.  Though the negotiations were 
informal, they received weighty consideration in Cabinet.  Originally the United States asked 
that it retain full custody of warheads for Canada’s armed forces.
78
  However, Diefenbaker, 
Green and Pearkes all agreed that this was unreasonable.  Pearkes suggested that Canadian forces 
provide an “exterior” or perimeter security around nuclear storage bunkers on Canadian bases 
and that this arrangement for joint custody was acceptable to the US.  This arrangement would 
ensure a Canadian veto over any deployment of the warheads.
79
  Thus Diefenbaker’s insistence 
on this principle was not Green’s achievement although his presence may have moulded 
Pearkes’ suggestion.  
Nonetheless, the SSEA continued to foster the impression that the Americans were not 
meeting Canada’s demands throughout 1960.  In January, prior to a planned statement by 
Diefenbaker on Canada’s nuclear policy, Green implied that Diefenbaker’s draft did not 
adequately emphasize Canada’s right to joint control.  Diefenbaker admitted that the 
government’s statements had been “rather foggy” and that “It was absolutely necessary that the 
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Cabinet be quite clear in its attitude towards nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.”  In his 
statement to the House of Commons, however, the prime minister remained decidedly unclear.  
On the one hand Diefenbaker claimed that “the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile to be effective 
would require nuclear warheads.”   In the same speech he also used a variety of phrases 
composed by Green to argue against any immediate decision.  Appealing to Diefenbaker’s 
indecisive nature, Green’s handwritten suggestions provided Diefenbaker with the diction and 
logic to justify continued postponement of any decision.  Reiterating the document’s emphasis of 
a Canadian choice rather than obligation to acquire nuclear weapons, Diefenbaker quoted prose 
such as, “may have to have” and “if and when they are required.”
80
  The Prime Minister 
understood the dichotomy in his speech as he highlighted both sections on his personal copy.
81
  
Thus under Green’s direct encouragement Diefenbaker not only failed to reaffirm his 
government’s commitment to atomic warheads, he distanced himself from it.   
Despite an increasing awareness that the operational deployment of Canada’s new 
weapons systems approached, Diefenbaker continued to emphasize the need for joint custody in 
July 1960 and his SSEA continued to buttress this belief.  For example, in a Cabinet meeting in 
the summer of 1960, Green claimed that: “So far the U.S. had not accepted Canada’s views in 
regarding to control.”
82
  More generally Diefenbaker continued to emphasize that negotiations 
were ongoing and that details would be forthcoming if agreement was achieved.
83
  The 
government’s ministers followed Diefenbaker’s lead and remained equally ambiguous.
84
  A 
frustrated Paul Hellyer (Trinity) asked: “Does the minister believe that within the year the policy 
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of atomic John will have an honest capability?”
85
  He received no reply.  Though committed to 
nuclear roles, Canada’s official position was becoming less and less certain. 
 
* * * 
 
Green’s foreign policy was now more mature.  He avoided describing Canada as a “world 
power” in the House of Commons but continued to agree with the description when others 
suggested it.  His designs for Canada in world affairs were remarkably similar to his intellectual 
ideals of 1943.  Canada did not have to hesitate before acting independently.  Its destiny in world 
affairs was not to be an “honest broker” because it needed to assert its own opinions rather than 
bring the US and UK together.  The Commonwealth remained an important part of Canada’s 
identity but in 1960 he was more concerned about the UN.
86
  He described Canada as a leader of 
the world’s “small nations” and envisioned Canada as a leader of global opinion, not a 
superpower.
87
  In short in Green’s intellectual vision for Canada role in world affairs now 
dominated his foreign policy; his actions more the result of an identity reordering than a crisis. 
He remained almost eternally optimistic, continually describing his reasons to believe 
that the disarmament negotiations would progress in the near future and that despair was out of 
the question and even went so far as to declare that Canada “has only friends and no enemies.”
88
 
Paul Martin, Peyton Lyon, Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann similarly criticize Green for his 
optimism, though Lyon admits that it might have been an “façade.”
89
  Perhaps his rhetoric was 
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overzealous, but Green believed optimism was necessary since: “If we all went into these 
negotiations convinced that nothing was going to happen, that there would be no success, I think 
there would be no chance whatever of success.  The issues are so great that in my personal 
opinion we must have hope that there will be success.”
90
 
Canada’s increasingly independent positions became a source of contention.  
Unsurprisingly France continued preparations to detonate its first atomic device despite the 
Moroccan resolution.  Anticipating this event, Green was asked for Canada’s position and was 
obviously angered.  “There is nothing further we [Canada] can do” Green eventually exclaimed: 
“we are against further nuclear tests, period.”
91
  This statement was a marked break with the 
Western position that demanded adequate assurance that a device could not be detonated 
secretly.  Scientific advances generally ensured adequate verification and aside from the question 
of inspection, one of the few outstanding concerns was how to distinguish between the relatively 
similar seismic signatures of earthquakes and the underground detonation of atomic devices with 
yields smaller than 20 kilotonnes (or 4.75 on the Richter scale).
92
  Initially the Liberals did not 
condone or condemn this new position.
93
  When France detonated its first device on February 13, 
1960, the policy change became more controversial. 
By the beginning of March 1960, the Liberals were more critical of Green’s position and 
Lester Pearson asked Green to elaborate on his short but blunt policy statement in the Standing 
Committee on External Affairs.  After describing his empathy for the three-power-talks’ 
continued to focus on verification measures, Green added: 
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We are not, however, in the nuclear business and so far as we are concerned we 
believe there should be no more tests.  That is the reason why we have taken that 
stand very clearly.  If we had taken the other stand which you [Pearson] seem to 
imply, to the effect that we want to have a control system worked out first and, 
once there is a control system, that when we favour no more nuclear tests, it 
would not have helped very much.  We believe it is of value for Canada to come 
right out and take the position that she believes there should be no more tests.
94
 
When Pearson asked if Green recognized that this was a departure from the Western position, 
Green replied: “We have been in disagreement with them in the past and probably will be in the 
future.”
95
  Other Conservatives quickly rallied to Green’s cause, asserting that the cessation of 
tests, rather than control, should be the goal of negotiations and Canada’s position was therefore 
correct.  At the next meeting Green was repeatedly asked whether he had really meant “no tests 
period” and the SSEA reiterated his stern position ad nauseam.  When pressed about the 
problems of seismic detection, Green commented that, although the problem remained, “It is 
always a little dangerous to impute motives, but I think certain countries want to have certain 
types of tests.”
96
  More generally, Green continued to fear fallout radiation from these tests and 
simply wanted the tests to cease.
97
  Aside from their obvious concern about the break in Western 
unity, the Liberals still did not contest the merit of Green’s stance.  Similarly, Norman Robertson 
seems to have been uncomfortable with the policy because his suggested statements for the 
Minister focused on Green’s declaration against further tests and avoided the sensitive issue of 
verification.
98
  Green was no puppet; he was now more than willing to choose his own policies. 
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 The issue might have died had the communiqué from Diefenbaker’s June 1960 meeting 
in Washington with President Eisenhower not included a brief statement requiring “effective 
international control” in any test-ban agreement that directly challenged Green’s position.
99
  
During question period on June 7 Paul Martin asked the government to account for this 
discrepancy.  Green had little choice but to insist that there was no divergence and continued to 
assert that the government was against any further tests.  Unsatisfied, Martin continued to press 
and only with the intervention of the Speaker and assurances from Diefenbaker that Canada was 
for “the complete termination of nuclear testing” was the issue dropped.
100
  When Pearson 
persisted, Green implicitly admitted that the communiqué was contrary to his position but 
insisted that the Prime Minister remained committed to the espoused policy of “no tests 
period.”
101
  The Opposition would continue to remind the government of its inconsistency until 
the Partial Test Ban Agreement in 1963.
102
 
Why Diefenbaker’s aides agreed to the communiqué’s text given the SSEA’s 
unequivocal stance is puzzling.  Perhaps it was a rare oversight?  Diefenbaker memoirs add 
another layer of confusion: the former Prime Minister claims that he had always “instructed 
[Canadian officials] to give equal emphasis… to the need for both a cessation of testing and… 
adequate safeguards.”
103
  Given the events described above, this was obviously not the case, 
though it may have been Diefenbaker’s preferred policy stance. General E.L.M. Burns implies 
that this discrepancy continued into 1963.
104
  Was Green’s declaration unplanned and indeed 
against Diefenbaker’s inclinations?  Was it calculated to move Diefenbaker towards a more 
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liberal position on testing?  Whatever the case, political scientist Peyton Lyon denounced the 
SSEA’s position as naïve and ill-conceived, insisting that it reduced Canada’s influence among 
its allies and also left its disarmament negotiators with little room to manoeuvre.
105
  While Burns 
recognizes this later criticism, he minimizes its significance.
106
  Moreover Lyon’s charge seems 
unfair: the statement pushed the Canada’s delegation to seek exactly what Green wanted, the 
cessation of tests.  Green overestimated Canada’s influence, but he believed that the superpowers 




As might be expected, Green’s fight in Geneva at the TNDC was very different from his 
home front skirmishes.  His conduct during the first six months of 1960 has received little 
attention in the Diefenbaker literature. After all, until June progress was slow.  Nevertheless, the 
discussions were central in Green’s mind, and he ensured Canada contributed wherever possible 
hoping for real progress.  While presenting the Estimates for External Affairs, he exclaimed that 
the TNDC “literally carries with it the hopes of mankind.”
108
  This persistent optimism motivated 
his decision to move General E.L.M. Burns from his work in the United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF) to become Canada’s Disarmament Ambassador as well as the advisor to Cabinet 
on the subject.
109
  His hopes would soon be disappointed. 
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Early talks quickly deadlocked over the same historically problematic themes, and a 
recess called in anticipation of Eisenhower and Khrushchev’s planned summit in May.  
Unfortunately, Khrushchev cancelled the summit after Gary’s Powers’ U-2 spy aircraft was shot 




  Despite the gloomy atmosphere, the TNDC resumed 
negotiations and received a new Soviet proposal on June 7, 1960.  This new plan offered some 
significant concessions to the West.  Foremost among these was the Soviet recognition of the 
need for “strict and effective international control” (verification of disarmament).
111
  Though 
Burns recognized the “strong political and propaganda appeal” of the new Soviet proposal, he 
believed the Soviet concessions were “genuine” and concluded: “It is therefore more necessary 
than ever to be prepared for serious negotiations.”
112
  Green echoed his advisor’s views and 
urged that the Soviet compromises be reciprocated.
113
  Despite the setback of early May, for 
Green it seemed that the negotiations were again acquiring momentum. 
The Western counter proposal took time to develop.  Before the plan could be tabled at 
the TNDC it had to be formulated, approved by the five Western members of the TNDC, and 
then NATO.
114
 Throughout this period of consultation the Soviets continually demanded answers 
to their policy questions from the understandably quiet Western delegations.
115
 In response, on 
June 27, the Eastern delegates, led by the Soviet Union, withdrew from the negotiations, 
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accusing the West of avoiding serious negotiation and merely stalling so that it could continue its 
own arms build-up.
116
  This walkout caught the West by surprise.  Even on the morning of June 
27, Canada’s officials in Paris continued to send messages to Ottawa regarding rushed NATO 
consultations regarding the West’s plan.
117
  Green wrote an optimistic letter to his son the 
evening before,
118
  Frustrated, he called the Soviets a “stupid lot of double-crossers.”
119
 In the 
House of Commons he said that the Soviets had “scuttled” the TNDC and after summarizing 
Canada’s position expressed “regret” for “having to give such a report.”
120
  Though Canada’s 




Green quickly rebounded and realigned his department’s focus to picking up the pieces of 
the disarmament negotiations. Even in his disheartened speech of June 27
th
, he had insisted that 
Canada would “continue to be very much in earnest and will do everything we possibly can to 
work out some solution to the problem.”
122
  To Green, the simplest means to ensure progress was 
to secure the resumption of negotiations via instruction from the UNDC.  At first, most Western 
governments agreed with Green’s position and also pushed for an early meeting of the UNDC in 
which to contrast their good faith with the Communist walkout.
123
  However Western interest 
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quickly cooled with France being the most obstinate.
124
  Norman Robertson described Canada’s 
reasons for pushing for an early meeting of the UNDC: 
The main reasons in taking the initiative now in the Disarmament Commission are 
to demonstrate Western willingness to negotiate, to expose the Soviet tactics of 
evasion, to undermine the Soviet position in the General Assembly, and at the 
same time to strengthen the Western position there.  More importantly for the 
West, however, the imminence of a Commission meeting serves to maintain the 
pressure for producing a unified Western plan.
125
 
Robertson went on to describe the limits of Canadian influence:  
Canada alone could not bring about a meeting of the Disarmament Commission, 
and it would not be desirable for us in any case to break ranks with our Western 
partners… However, it seems entiraly [sic] appropriate and desirable that we 




Alone  Canada’s influence was limited; however, it could lobby its allies as well as any other 
country that would listen to create the necessary pressure for a meeting.  Under Green’s direct 
orders, Canadian ambassadors in Western capitals lobbied for an early meeting.  By July 15 the 
Eisenhower government changed its position and now agreed to ask the world for a meeting of 
the UNDC in August.
127
  With this decision the US’s allies fell into line and even France agreed 
not to oppose the US move.  All efforts would be made to limit discussions to procedural 
matters, including the resumption of negotiations rather than disarmament itself, and this suited 
the Canadian view.
128
  Canada then began to lobby governments all over the world to come to 
the meeting, again emphasizing the need for the resumption of negotiations.  The vast majority 
of countries responded favourably with only the Soviet bloc (and Finland) responding negatively 
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and India temporarily withholding its consent.
129
  Canada’s interpretation of international politics 
and resulting actions were puissant: 
USSR is going to extraordinary lengths in its efforts to persuade Asian, African 
and other uncommitted countries that it would not r[e]p[ea]t not be useful to have 
a meeting of the disarmament commission at this time.  In the past few days 
soviet reps have given numerous luncheons on the per[manent] rep[resentative] 
level to expound their views and have been lobbying intensively in the corridors 
in combination with all other members of the Soviet bloc.  From the magnitude of 
the Soviet lobbying it appears that they have a real fear of being placed in an 
unfavourable light if a meeting of the disarmament commission takes place. 
[After Canadian counter-lobbying] an increasing number of the wavering 
countries are coming to see that the Soviet objections are excessive and 
exaggerated in terms of the modest and relatively non-controversial objectives the 
Western countries have in mind.
130
 
Most significantly, throughout this lobbying campaign, the Soviets refused to announce a boycott 
of the meeting should it occur.
131
  Encouraged, Green and his department continued to press for a 
moderate Western stance and in the end the Soviets bloc and India agreed to attend the August 
16 meeting. 
Speaking to the UNDC on the opening day as the only Foreign Minister present, Green’s 
message was forceful, but as non-partisan as possible to make his message for renewed 
negotiations more palatable. He complained that the negotiations “need never have been broken 
off” and, while he admitted that progress “was unsatisfactory” and that differences could only be 
overcome with difficulty, he maintained that the talks had led to some congruence.
132
  Over the 
next three days, Green and his delegation chiefly focused on the non-aligned draft-resolution 
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requesting resumption which unfortunately accommodated Soviet desires at the expense of the 
West.  Though they need not be recounted here, Canada eventually proposed three revisions on 
August 18 that strengthened the resolution’s call for renewed negotiations by a small body 
(rather than at the UNGA as the Soviet’s wished).  This effort seems to have had the desired 
effect and the non-aligned sponsors continued to negotiate with the UK and US with hopes of 
reaching a compromise.
133
  After more talks a resolution accommodating all of Canada’s 




Green’s initiative paid off.  Despite initial opposition in the West and continued 
opposition from the Soviets, Green and others succeeded in mobilizing world opinion to achieve 
consensus on a modest though important resolution.  Green took great pride in Canada’s 
contribution.  It had fought hard for the meeting as well as making the non-aligned resolution 
more palatable.  Though generally supportive of the West’s position, Canada had applied 
pressure to all sides.  Green bragged about the success in the House of Commons, describing the 
resolution as a product of Canadian efforts.  When asked to describe a particularly memorable 
event in his career, Green called the events of July and August 1960 a “great triumph for Canada 
because we had taken the lead throughout.”
135
 
Unfortunately little resulted from Canada’s initiative.  First, an American election was 
only a few months away and all states recognized that the outgoing Eisenhower administration 
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was not going to commit to any dramatic or binding disarmament measures.
136
  Green was aware 
of this problem, but because the Soviets demanded that disarmament negotiations be resumed at 
the 15
th
 session of the UNGA, Green believed a resolution from the UNDC would actually 
facilitate earnest negotiations by removing substantial discussion of disarmament policy from the 
propaganda prone UNGA.
137
  Second, the non-aligned members of the United Nations (and 
UNDC) had long desired inclusion in the negotiations.  Although there was consensus about the 
reasonableness of this demand, difficulty arose regarding selecting which countries would be 
invited.
138
  Until the problem was resolved, there was little chance of resumed talks.  Therefore 
Green’s demands for reconvening negotiations before the 15th session of the UNGA were 
unreasonable and somewhat devalued his cause, but his earnest desire for resumed negotiations 
is noteworthy.  He continued to believe that the only way to break the deadlock in negotiations 
was for world opinion to apply “terrific pressure” on the nuclear powers to come to an 
agreement.
139
  Thus Canada’s SSEA prepared to again push the world to resume disarmament 
negotiations. 
 
* * * 
 
By mid-October 1960, the time seemed right for Green to propose his new initiative. The 
UNGA’s fifteenth session was in full swing and a variety of countries proposed disarmament 
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  In a speech on October 19, Green suggested a variety of measures that he believed 
would rekindle the disarmament negotiations, including the appointment of a neutral chairman 
for any future negotiations.  In addition, Green proposed that the UNDC create an “advisory 
committee” of approximately ten to twelve non-nuclear states not currently serving on the TNDC 
to offer “advice and encouragement to the negotiators.”
141
  Green hoped that this body’s 
disinterest in nuclear proliferation and diverse geographical representation would result in 
compromises that the bi-polar TNDC (and its predecessors) had been proven incapable of 
supplying.  Despite some objection from Burns, Canada’s SSEA had long expressed a desire to 
see the non-aligned states involved in the disarmament negotiations.  The major powers would 
maintain final power over any agreement, but Green’s hope was that this body would facilitate: 
“hard bargaining about concrete measures, pursued in good faith with patience and determination 
to reach agreement.”
142
  This policy formulation and pressure role quickly became a stumbling 
block for the great powers, and especially the US,
143
 that feared that it would detract from their 
ability to control the agenda.
 144
 
On November 1, Green formally introduced these ideas in draft resolution 255, co-
sponsored by Norway and Sweden.  In his speech, Green emphasized the “universal desire and 
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need” for “revitalized” negotiations.  He reiterated many of the suggestions from his earlier 
address, but because of opposition from the great powers he substituted the advisory committee 
for an ad hoc committee. Though the committee’s mandate would be to foster the resumption of 
negotiations the name now suggested a temporary and flexible rather than permanent status and 
thereby perpetuated the major powers’ control.
145
  Legault and Fortmann have suggested that 
expecting the major powers to agree to the creation of another organization allowing more states 
to influence the negotiations “was akin to believing that the Moon is made of ‘Green’ cheese.”
146
   
They were correct. Norman Robertson began to caution Green against pushing too hard should 
the course of debate preclude Canada’s initiative, but the SSEA would have none of it.
147
 Even 
General Burns admitted that Green’s actions “sometimes put Canadian diplomats in the position 
of being asked to make bricks without straw.”
148
 Legault and Fortmann also imply that Green 
only realized this impossibility late in the draft resolution’s formulation.
149
  Actually, the 
resolution underwent ongoing changes to combat this precise concern. The SSEA renewed 
solicitations for sponsorship with any country that would listen and a variety of countries 
obliged.
150
  He also redoubled discussions with the United States because their approval would 
reduce the hesitation of others.  At first US officials were pessimistic but willing to talk.  A 
variety of revisions were considered and eventually the US committed to voting for a revised 
version of the Canadian resolution.  The revised Canadian resolution now assigned the UNDC 
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the duty of “watch-dog” but still asked that the UNDC give “consideration to the appointment” 
of an ad hoc committee if circumstances proved auspicious.
151
 Green’s fundamental goal was to 
secure the early resumption of negotiations; if that required compromise, he was willing to bend. 
This further revised resolution garnered a variety of new co-sponsors and, it was believed, “had 
good prospects of carrying if put to a vote.”
152




Opposition remained.  The USSR was against the Canadian initiative, and the UK 
promised to support it only “out of friendship for Canada.”
154
  Other resolutions also stood in 
Green’s way.  The 15
th
 session of the UNGA had proven fertile ground for disarmament draft 
resolutions.  Many of these were designed for propaganda rather than facilitation.  India 
experienced considerable difficulty attracting support for a resolution attempting to establish 
principles of disarmament that both sides could accept.  Opinions differed regarding whether the 
Indian and Canadian draft resolutions were complimentary or competing, but since the Indian 
initiative remained unpopular, the Canadian delegation had not worried.
155
  Unfortunately, the 
session was nearly complete, and insufficient time remained for votes on all of the draft 
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resolutions and only three drafts had non-partisan support in the UNGA.  Because the Canadian 
resolution did not have Soviet support, many UN representatives wanted to group it with the 
more contentious resolutions despite its relatively widespread, albeit lukewarm, support.  India 
asked that the Canadian resolution be grouped with the contentious resolutions rather than the 
ones likely to pass.  At this juncture the Canadian delegation as well as the majority of its co-
sponsors became convinced that pursuing a vote was hopeless.
156
  Nonetheless, Green demanded 
that a vote be held.  A roll-call vote was held, and India won 29 in favour, 17 against, with 26 
abstentions.  Eleven of Canada’s co-sponsors abstained or were absent during the vote.  When 




Legault and Fortmann aptly conclude that by insisting on a vote, Canada lost prestige.  
Their comment that “Green believed come hell or high water he could change the world by his 
incessant appeals for negotiation… [and that] he found it more important to talk to a brick wall 
than to relinquish the right to speak” is unfair.
158
  Certainly, Canada’s SSEA was forced to admit 
that his country’s power was more limited that he had estimated, however, he had always 
acknowledged the supremacy of the nuclear powers and the resolution’s raison d’être had been 
to safeguard this while encouraging greater non-aligned participation.  Indeed, both the US and 
UK voted against postponing a vote on the Canadian resolution.  Green simply wanted to ensure 
that the nuclear powers continued to talk and took solace in having demonstrated that he “meant 
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  In future he would be more mindful of the limits of Canadian influence, but he 




* * * 
 
Howard Green’s focus on disarmament did not occur in a vacuum.  Throughout the later 
half of 1960 pressure mounted regarding nuclear warheads. When the Canada-US Committee on 
Joint Defence met at Montebello in July 1960 United States accepted Canada’s demand that the 
US not exercise sole custody of warheads at Goose Bay.
161
  Given this concession, Green 
received a letter from Pearkes on September 21 asking that DEA accept the new American 
proposal.
162
  Again, on November 30
th
, R.B. Bryce demanded that Canada “should proceed now 
without delay to conclude the agreement” regarding Goose and Harmon and also asked that 
negotiations leading to the acquisition of warheads for the Canadian military also begin.
163
  
Frustrated, Pearkes retired from the Diefenbaker government to become British Columbia’s 
Lieutenant-Governor.  His replacement, Douglas Harkness, also applied pressure but was 
moderated for a time by assurances from Diefenbaker that the agreement would be signed once 
Green would no longer feel embarrassed.
164
  This led to a Cabinet decision on December 6 to 
resume negotiations regarding warheads for Canadian forces.  Before speaking with the US, 
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Green and Harkness proposed a draft agreement which was ready for Cabinet by December 30.  
Green secured his demands for joint control via Canadian responsibility for the external security 
of sites.  However this progress should not be overemphasized Diefenbaker also insisted that 
Canada could only accept nuclear weapons on its soil if agreements for all warheads be decided 
as a “package.”  The prime minister insisted on this measure, at least in part, because he believed 
it would preserve Canada’s bargaining power in other negotiations such as any Swap deal.
165
  
Any decision on weapons for American forces on Canadian soil was therefore postponed.
166
  
However, now more convicted than ever, Green went further than merely fostering reasons for 
delay.  He pushed for a genuine, though temporary refusal of nuclear arms. 
Ireland provided Green with this additional means to delay.  Since 1958, Ireland 
proposed increasingly strong resolutions in the UNGA condemning the spread of nuclear 
weapons.
167
   The 1960 Irish initiative in part called “upon Powers not possessing such [atomic] 
weapons, on a similar temporary and voluntary basis, to refrain from manufacturing these 
weapons and from otherwise attempting to acquire them.”
168
 Any states that voted for the 
resolution therefore “temporarily” promised to only arm its militaries with conventional 
warheads.  Though the spirit of this resolution had been long known, the specific language was 
crucial, and thus, the Diefenbaker government waited for the resolution to mature before forming 
any policy.  DND asked that Canada abstain from the vote or propose amendments that would 
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A few weeks later Diefenbaker turned again when he rejected a brief but moderate note 
from Harkness asking that Canadian troops be trained in the use of nuclear warheads “If and 
when nuclear weapons are required.”
171
   The Prime Minister told his audience at the Canadian 
Club that Canada required joint control and that, despite his personal doubts regarding 
advancement, “no decision will be made while progress towards disarmament continues.”
172
  
Diefenbaker’s commitment to nuclear warheads for Canada’s forces was increasingly unclear.  
Because it had been long intended that the Harmon and Goose Bay agreement be signed first, the 
Irish resolution and Diefenbaker’s changing views threatened to jeopardize all of the acquisition 
negotiations. 
More generally the Irish resolution was eclipsed by other unrelated concerns until 
December 1, when a UNGA vote was imminent.  The Department of External Affairs 
recommended that Canada vote for the Irish resolution.  Since “Most N.A.TO. countries intended 
to abstain” to prevent any constraint on nuclear developments with the NATO alliance, and 
because the government believed it had not yet announced its nuclear policy (despite having 
ordered weapons systems requiring nuclear warheads), the Cabinet elected to instruct the 
Canadian delegation to abstain “because to support it would imply a contradiction of these recent 
statements.”
173
  Here was a principled objection to Green’s position at the UN.  When Green 
received Cabinet’s instructions he deliberately kept them from the delegation.  Both Green and 
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Robinson appealed on DEA’s behalf, claiming that, because of Green’s reputation regarding 
disarmament, he would “suffer severe loss of prestige” if Canada abstained.
174
  The Prime 
Minister agreed to reconsider the vote in Cabinet. 
On December 6 Green received his hearing.  After making it clear that a positive vote 
would not be consistent with the majority of NATO countries, he explained that: “Abstention 
would place him in an impossible position.”   He then presented the Irish resolution as a further 
opportunity to delay a decision on nuclear weapons.  “The terms of the Irish resolution would 
only be binding until next September at the latest [presumably the following UNGA session],” 
he explained.  Support for the resolution was thus merely “a statement at the time” rather than a 
long-term declaration.  Moreover, he supported the idea of a brief speech tying a positive 
Canadian vote to further progress regarding the spread of nuclear weapons.  If significant 
progress did not result “Canada would have to reconsider its position.”
175
  Green’s interpretation 
at once minimized the commitment to a positive vote and exaggerated the commitments entailed 
by abstention. 
Others in the Cabinet challenged Green’s interpretation.  Canada’s new aircraft and 
missiles were quickly nearing their initial delivery deadlines and their deployment would require 
a payload decision.  In the end Diefenbaker cautiously sided with Green, declaring that “The 
Cabinet should not decide at this time whether or not nuclear weapons should be acquired” and 
that his previous policy statements were sufficient for the time being.
176
  He feared the 
resignation of either Green or Harkness, and therefore “emphasized again the necessity for 
                                                
174
 JGD for File, “Re: Disarmament”, 3 December 1960, Diefenbaker Papers, MG01/VII/A/788 Disarmament n.d., 
1948-1966. 
175
 Cabinet Conclusions, 6 December 1960, 6. 
176
 Ibid, 7-8. 
111 
remaining silent so far as possible on these matters.”
177
  Yet again, Green’s delay argument won 
Diefenbaker’s favour. 
 A few days before the vote, Canada announced its intention to vote for the Irish 
resolution and at the same time expressed doubt that states could perpetually abstain from 
nuclear weapons without progress in disarmament negotiations.
178
 Through sheer determination, 
Green secured the right to continue his disarmament crusade into 1961, though only barely.  
Neither the Cabinet, nor the Prime Minister (who feared the label of “disarmament party”) 
empathized to any considerable extent.
179
  Nevertheless, Green had noticeably braked Canada’s 
nuclear odyssey.  His conversion was now complete. 
 
* * * 
 
 By December 1960, reporter Peter Trueman wrote: “There is no stiletto [or bayonet], no 
Bible anymore, just a conviction that the world should not be allowed to go up in a mushroom 
cloud as long as countries like Canada have vocal chords.”
180
  This conversion had not occurred 
overnight, requiring a year-and-a-half.  As Green’s courage grew, his department generated 
tactics and policies to support his initiatives in the UN and in Cabinet.  Arguments regarding 
Canadian sovereignty, disarmament successes, and improved bargaining positions delayed 
acquiring nuclear warheads.  When Diefenbaker began to beat Green to the punch, Green 
buttressed the Prime Minister’s initiative.  Clearly Green’s convictions were very different than a 
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year-and-a-half previous when he agreed with (or at least failed to oppose) his fellow Cabinet 
members regarding Canada’s nuclear trajectory.  However, his new ardent views on disarmament 






 Howard Green was a man of conviction, and was described as such throughout his life.  
This thesis has applied this label to Green’s intellectual and political development through his 
evolving ideas about war from the Great War to 1960.  Green felt an obligation to enlist in the 
First World War and believed in the righteousness of the Empire’s cause.  Nearly a year in the 
trenches did not dampen his belief in the cause for which he and his comrade’s fought, and his 
pro-war rhetoric remained thick even after the conflict’s conclusion.  When exiled to the 
Canadian Corps Infantry School as an instructor, Green felt guilty for being insulated from the 
dangers of the frontlines.  His later transfer to the 6
th
 Brigade as a staff learner calmed his anxiety 
and he excelled in his duties until war’s end.  He remained proud of Canada’s victory, enjoying 
the triumphal march to the Rhine and rubbing it in when in the presence of young Germans.  
Green craved a promotion and was overjoyed when he received this recognition of performance 
while in the service of his country.  He left Europe aware of the costs of war, but never doubted 
that armed conflict would continue to be a worthwhile endeavour under the right circumstances. 
 Green reaffirmed his conviction about the necessity of war and its proper prosecution 
during the Second World War.  Though he understood the costs of war, he believed that a total 
war effort was necessary.  When Mackenzie King proved unwilling, Green and his party lobbied 
unceasingly. The government’s reluctance to conscript Canadian males for overseas service is 
the most obvious example of this desire.  Even at war’s end, Green continued to press for 
conscripts to be deployed in the Pacific theatre.  Though unpopular amongst most Canadians, 
this commitment exemplified his continued belief in war as a legitimate part of foreign policy. 
114 
 Green’s efforts shifted to other subjects at the end of the Second World War.  He returned 
to his long-held interest in veterans’ affairs and fought hard for a more inclusive Veteran’s 
Charter.  His continued pride for Canada’s veterans demonstrates no disgust with war.  
Moreover, Green’s statements during the Korean conflict demonstrate that, far from fearing war, 
he continued to believe in its necessity and that, when embarked upon, it needed to prosecuted to 
the fullest. 
 He made these provocative statements despite his considerable knowledge of 
advancements in nuclear arms.  His interest in nuclear technology stretched back to 1946 when 
he fought for Parliamentary oversight of Canada’s atomic programs and policies.  Over the next 
decade he received a remarkable education in atomic technology, including its effects if 
deployed in weaponry.  Yet he remained unmoved by the destruction these weapons could 
wreak, and despite subsequent events (such as the test at Bikini Atoll) he did not embrace 
disarmament. 
 Interest in external affairs also remained a constant throughout his career.  He acquired 
considerable knowledge on the subject but his early ideas remained undeveloped and 
contradictory.  The Suez Crisis evoked these emotional responses and it was only after careful 
thought and guidance from External Affairs officials that Green’s love for the Commonwealth 
moderated to a less militant strain.  That his long held views changed so quickly suggests that his 
intellectual ideals matched his new policies.  The change was an evolutionary shift, not a 
revolution. 
 The most remarkable alteration to Green’s foreign policy concerned disarmament.  
Further scientific advancements regarding the impacts of nuclear war in the late 1950s convinced 
Green to pursue the cause of disarmament.  New studies regarding the effects and global 
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distribution of fallout led Green to believe that nuclear war was no longer survivable.  At the 
outset he remained uncomfortable with his new convictions.  His first initiative at the UNGA 
was therefore cautious; but the unanimous passage of the Canadian resolution, as well as 
Canada’s expressed opposition to France’s nuclear weapon program, fortified Green’s courage 
and conviction.  During 1960 Green provided Diefenbaker with means to delay a decision on 
whether to acquire nuclear warheads or to permit American forces to deploy them on Canadian 
soil, while concurrently pushing harder for progress at international disarmament negotiations.  
When the negotiations at the TNDC failed, Green persevered and again secured, at least in 
principle, what he desired: a promise to renew negotiations at the first available opportunity.  
While the countries which would compose the negotiating body and the principles that would 
govern its discussions, remained undefined, Canada and other countries attempted to shape the 
debate.  Canada’s initiative failed in the end, but Green continued to push for disarmament – 
despite increasing Cabinet conflict – and thereby contributed to Diefenbaker’s failure to fulfil his 
promise to acquire nuclear weapons.  Despite the ongoing turmoil in both Cabinet and the House 
of Commons it was only after Lester Pearson became Prime Minister in 1963 did Canada finally 
fulfilled its promise to accept nuclear weapons.
1
 
Green’s conversion in the summer of 1959 surprised many observers.  The previous, 
linear narrative suggesting that Green’s opposition to atomic weaponry stemmed from an 
aversion to war developed in the trenches of the Western Front, is clearly incorrect.  
Understanding why individuals such as Green, Burns, and Robertson supported disarmament 
against such overwhelming opposition, and in Green’s case against his own past beliefs, is 
crucial to understanding why the Diefenbaker government behaved as it did.  To date, authors 
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have generally focused on the Defender narrative.  They have dismissed Green’s hopes as 
unreasonable and have concluded that he and his supporters were either naïve or irrational.  
While Critics in the late 1950s and early 1960s misjudged their surroundings, these men were 
intelligent and should not be dismissed as naïve.  They viewed the world through a different lens 
than many of their contemporaries: one which dictated that they surmount incredible opposition 
or face imminent destruction.  For better or worse, they were also in a position to try to do 
something about it.  Although the nuclear Critics did not achieve their desired ends, historians 
need to carefully situate their subjects in historical context, resisting the temptation to paint 
simple portraits that can belie understanding when and why they developed the stances that they 
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